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Abstract 
This paper develops a comprehensive framework for the quantitative analysis of the private 
and fiscal returns to schooling and of the effect of public policies on private incentives to invest 
in education. This framework is applied to 14 member states of the European Union. For each of 
these countries, we construct estimates of the private return to an additional year of schooling 
for an individual of average attainment, taking into account the effects of education on wages 
and employment probabilities after allowing for academic failure rates, the direct and 
opportunity costs of schooling, and the impact of personal taxes, social security contributions 
and unemployment and pension benefits on net incomes. We also construct a set of effective tax 
and subsidy rates that measure the effects of different public policies on the private returns to 
education, and measures of the fiscal returns to schooling that capture the long-term effects of a 
marginal increase in attainment on public finances under conditions that approximate general 
equilibrium. 
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 1. Introduction 
This paper develops a comprehensive framework for the quantitative analysis of the private 
and fiscal returns to schooling and of the effect of public policies on private incentives to invest 
in education. This framework is applied to 14 member states of the European Union. For each of 
these countries we construct estimates of the private return to an additional year of schooling 
for an individual of average attainment, taking into account the effects of education on wages 
and employment probabilities after allowing for academic failure rates, the direct and 
opportunity costs of schooling, and the impact of personal taxes, social security contributions 
and unemployment and pension benefits on net lifetime incomes. We also construct a set of 
effective tax and subsidy rates that measure the effects of different public policies on the private 
returns to education, and measures of the fiscal returns to schooling that capture the long-term 
effects of a marginal increase in attainment on public finances under conditions that 
approximate general equilibrium. 
The paper builds on the extensive literature that has sought to quantify the economic returns to 
schooling and brings together several of its strands. A large number of studies have explored 
the effects of education on wages and employment using individual-level data.1 Wage effect 
estimates obtained in this manner can be interpreted as approximations to the rate of return to 
schooling but only under very stringent assumptions that include the absence of direct 
educational costs and infinite working lives. Another set of papers has focused on the 
construction of more elaborate estimates of the rate of return to schooling by discounting the 
lifetime earnings profiles associated with different educational levels. While this "full 
discounting" approach is conceptually well suited for the joint analysis of wage and 
employment effects and for quantifying the impact of educational finance and tax and benefit 
policies on the returns to schooling, systematic attempts to bring all or most of these factors into 
the analysis and to isolate their respective effects seem to be rather scarce in the literature.2 Two 
interesting papers that make considerable progress in this direction are Barceinas et al (2000a) 
and Blöndal, Field and Girouard (2002). Both of these studies allow explicitly for 
unemployment when calculating the rate of return to education. In addition, Barceinas et al take 
into account unemployment benefits, while Blöndal et al allow for taxes and isolate the 
                                                
1 Wage equation studies have generally adopted the specification proposed by Mincer (1974). 
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002) collect the results of such studies for a large number of countries and 
Card (1999) surveys the relevant literature focusing on estimation issues. On the impact of education on 
unemployment, see among others Ashenfelter and Ham (1979), Nickell (1979) and Mincer (1991). 
2 On the other hand, many studies have introduced explicit corrections for unemployment and taxes when 
calculating rates of return by the full discounting method (see Psacharopoulos, 1995). There are also many 
studies that implicitly allow for taxes and/or unemployment in the estimation of Mincerian rates of return 
by using data on net-of-tax wages or on total earnings rather than on gross hourly wage rates (see for 
instance Nickell, 1979). 
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contribution of educational subsidies to private returns. Another paper of interest is 
O'Donoghue (1999), who combines wage equation estimates with a microsimulation model to 
explore the effects of taxes and social benefits on the returns to schooling in four EU countries. 
This paper and a second study by Barceinas et al (2000b)3 are the only ones we are aware of that 
investigate the fiscal implications of investment in education. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we derive an almost closed-form expression for 
the private rate of return to schooling. This formula can be seen as a compromise between the 
two approaches outlined above. It provides a simple and intuitive way to combine the 
parameters commonly estimated in wage and employment equation studies with data on 
educational expenditure and academic failure rates and with a broad set of tax and social 
benefit parameters to construct comprehensive measures of the return to schooling that take 
into account a number of factors that have not generally been considered jointly in the 
literature. This is of course achieved at the price of some strong simplifying assumptions about 
the evolution of wages, employment probabilities and tax and benefit rates over the lifecycle. 
Hence, our procedure can only be regarded as an approximation to the full discounting 
method, but it does have the important advantage that it is much less data and computation 
intensive, and is therefore better suited for broad cross country comparisons.  
Section 3 shows how this approach can be used to construct quantitative measures of the impact 
of various public policies on individual incentives to invest in education, essentially by 
applying the private returns formula under different counterfactual assumptions. We start from 
a hypothetical scenario in which there is no government intervention and sequentially 
introduce 1) educational subsidies and the public provision of free education, 2) personal 
income taxes, including employee social security contributions, 3) unemployment insurance 
and housing benefits for the unemployed and 4) retirement benefits. The effective tax rate on 
schooling and the components of this rate induced by each of these policies are then 
constructed by comparing private returns in the different scenarios. Section 4 extends our 
framework to analyse the fiscal implications of public investment in education. The fiscal rate of 
return to schooling and the net present fiscal value of an additional year of formal education are 
calculated using the same procedure as in section 2, but considering only tax and benefit flows 
and introducing some adjustments that attempt to approximate general equilibrium conditions. 
Section 5 discusses the data and parameter values used in our calculations. Raw measures of the 
effects of schooling on wages, employment probabilities and participation rates come from 
Mincerian wage equations and employment and participation probits estimated separately for 
each country with individual-level data and corrected, to the extent possible, for endogeneity 
bias. Average and marginal tax and social benefit rates, measures of the direct cost of education 
and academic failure indicators come mainly from various OECD publications. Fiscal 
parameters are those applicable to a single and childless individual of average attainment in 
each country in 2000. Finally, sections 6 and 7 present the results of the analysis for 14 member 
                                                
3 We thank F. Alcalá for this reference. 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
countries of the European Union (EU) and section 8 concludes with a summary of the main 
findings and a discussion of their policy implications. 
 
 2. An almost closed-form private returns formula 
Any individual enrolled in post-compulsory education faces at each point in his career a choice 
between continuing his training and withdrawing from school to enter the labour market on a 
full-time basis. While other factors are certainly at work, the option to remain in school is at 
least in part an investment decision for it involves a trade-off between current costs (foregone 
wages, tuition charges and other school-related expenses) and future benefits (the expected 
increase in earnings associated with higher qualifications). 
As in the case of more standard investment projects, the financial payoff to an additional year of 
schooling can be quantified by computing its internal rate of return, which is formally defined 
as the discount rate that equates the present value of the relevant streams of incremental 
pecuniary costs and benefits. In this section we will derive a formula for the calculation of this 
rate of return. The calculation will take into account the explicit costs of schooling born by a 
representative agent in each country, his opportunity cost in the form of foregone labour 
income and lost work experience, and the expected increase in future net-of-tax labour earnings 
and unemployment and pension benefits arising both from higher wages and from higher 
employment probabilities.  
Consider an individual who attends school for X years, successfully completes S(X) grades, 
retires at time U and is expected to live until time Z. We are interested in the effects of one 
additional year of formal schooling on his expected flows of after-tax labour income and net 
social benefits, taking into account that educational attainment affects both wages and the 
probability of employment. 
Wages increase over time as a result of exogenous technical progress and the accumulation of 
physical capital and experience. We will assume that the wage at time t of an individual with 
schooling X and h = t - X years of experience is given by 
  (1)   
 
W(t, X, h) = At f S( X)( )e
!h
= Aoe
gt f S(X)( )e! (t"X) = Aoe
(g +! )t f S(X)( )e"!X   for t∈[X, U] 
where At is an efficiency index that reflects both technological progress and aggregate capital 
accumulation. The effects of schooling are captured by the function f[S(X)], where S denotes 
school attainment measured by the number of successfully completed grades, which is in turn 
an increasing function of the time spent in school, X. For simplicity, the experience premium on 
wages, eνh, is assumed to be a function of potential experience (i.e. of the time that has passed 
since the individual left school) rather than of actual years of employment, and to grow at a 
constant rate (which means that it will not display the hump often found in empirical wage-
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experience profiles).4 We will approximate the wage of the "average worker" in the economy, 
Wo, by that corresponding to an individual of average attainment, Xo, at the mid-point of his 
career, that is, 
  (2) Wo(t) = W (t,Xo ,Ho / 2) = Aoegt f S(Xo )( )evHo /2  
where  
  (3) Ho ≡   U - Xo, 
is the expected duration of the working life of an individual of average attainment. 
The probability of employment will be assumed to be an increasing (and time-invariant) 
function of schooling. We will denote by p[S(X)] the function describing this relation in the case 
of an adult worker seeking full-time employment, and by ps(S) = ηp(S) the analogous function 
for a student seeking part-time employment. Hence, η  is an adjustment coefficient that corrects 
for the differential employment probability of students. 
We will allow for taxes and for unemployment and pension benefits. To keep the problem 
tractable, we need to assume that tax rates depend only on the agent's status (that is, on 
whether he is employed, unemployed or retired) and do not change over time as his income 
rises with technical progress and experience.5 To achieve this, we will assume that tax rates are 
a function of X alone, so the net-of-tax earnings per "efficiency unit of labour" at time t of an 
adult worker with X years of training who is employed full time will be given by 
  (4)   
 
Fe (X) =
  
 
e!"X f S(X)[ ] !T e!"X f S(X)[ ]( ) 
where T() is the total tax due per efficiency unit of labour. If the same worker is unemployed, he 
is entitled to a benefit which will be a function of previous earnings. An unemployed worker's 
net income per efficiency unit of labour will be given by 
  (5)   
 
Fu(X) =
  
 
B e!"X f S( X)[ ]( ) !T B e!"X f S(X)[ ]( )# $ % 
& 
' 
(  
where 
  
 
B e!"X f S( X)[ ]( ) is the benefit per efficiency unit of labour, written as a function of the 
wage prior to the loss of employment. The expected net income at time t of an adult worker can 
then be written 
                                                
4 There is some evidence (see for instance Brunello and Comi (2004) and the references therein) that ν is 
also an increasing function of educational attainment. Since we will not take this effect into account, our 
calculations will tend to underestimate the return to schooling. 
5 The first part of this assumption --that tax rates do not change over time as average incomes rise with 
technical progress and factor accumulation-- may not be a bad approximation in the medium or long run. 
While tax brackets are not explicitly indexed to average wages in any country in our sample, periodic 
reforms may work in this direction. Otherwise, fiscal drag would gradually raise income tax receipts as a 
fraction of GDP and this does not seem to have been the case in EU countries over the last two decades. 
The second half of the assumption --that tax rates remain constant over an individual's life cycle-- is harder 
to defend. To minimize the error it induces in our computations, we will work with tax rates that 
approximate those applicable to the representative worker at the mid-point of his career and at the 
midpoint of his retirement period. 
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  (6)   
 
F( X)Aoe
(g+! )t
=   
 
p S(X)[ ]Fe( X) + 1 ! p S(X)[ ]( )Fu(X){ } Aoe
(g +" )t  
where we have multiplied F(X) by the non-education component of the wage function W(t, X, t-
X) in order to recover total expected labour income from the functions Fe() and Fu() that give 
wages per efficiency unit of labour. 
We will assume that students are not entitled to unemployment benefits (which is true in most 
countries, as a minimum period of previous employment is generally required for contributory 
benefits), and that their wages, Ws, do not rise with experience. We will write the gross income 
of a student with attainment x as a fraction (1-φ) of the wages of an adult full-time worker of 
average experience with the same qualifications, 
  (7)   
 
Ws (t, x) = (1 !")W(t , x, Ho / 2) = (1!" )f S( x)( )Aoe
gte#H o / 2 . 
Hence, we can think of φ  as the fraction of the work year devoted to full-time school attendance 
but it should be kept in mind that this parameter will also implicitly capture other factors (such 
as the lack of experience and the nature of the jobs available to young people who seek part-
time or summer employment) that will influence the wages of students relative to those of adult 
workers. Under these assumptions, the expected net earnings at time t of a student who has 
completed x years of training are given by 
  (8)   
 
Aoe
gte!Ho / 2Fs( x) =   
 
ps S(x)[ ] (1 !") f S(x)[ ] !T (1 !") f S(x)[ ]( ){ }Aoe
gte#Ho / 2  
where ps() = ηp() is the relevant probability of employment as discussed above. 
We will also take into account pensions. We will assume that the initial pension, PU, is set as a 
function of the worker’s average earnings (as captured by the educational component of wages) 
  (9) Pu X( ) = Aoe(g+! )UP f S(X)( )e"!X#$ %&  
and that its real value grows over time at a constant rate, ω, so that 
  (10) Pt X( ) = Pu X( )e! (t"U ) = Aoe(g+# )UP f S(X)( )e"#X$% &'e! (t"U ) = Aoe(g+#"! )UP f S(X)( )e"#X$% &'e!t  
for t > U. Assuming as above that tax rates are a function of X but not of time, the net-of-tax 
pension at time t (> U) will be given by 
  (11) A
o
e
(g+!"# )U
e
#t
F
p
X( ) $ P f S(X)( )e"!X%& '( " T P f S(X)( )e
"!X%& '(%&
'
({ }Aoe
(g+!"# )U
e
#t . 
Finally, we will assume that the direct cost to the agent of each year of schooling is a constant 
fraction µs of the earnings of the average worker, 
  (12)   
 
µsWo(t) = µsAoe
gt f S( Xo)( )e
!Ho / 2 . 
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Given these assumptions, the present value of the agent's expected lifetime net earnings can be 
written 
  (13) V(X) = 
  
 
Aoe
!Ho / 2Fs (t)
0
X
" e#(R +! )t dt  + 
  
 
AoF(X)
X
U
! e"Rt dt +  
    + 
  
 
Aoe
(g +! "# )UFp X( )e
"(R+ g+! "# )t
U
Z
$ dt  -   
 
µs
0
X
! Aoe"H o / 2 f (So )e#(R+") tdt  
where r  is the discount rate,  So ≡  S(Xo), and  
  (14) R ≡ r - g - ν. 
The first term on the right-hand side of (13) denotes the present value of expected labour 
earnings while attending school and (potentially) working part-time between times 0 and X; the 
second term gives the present value of labour income and unemployment benefits over the 
individual's post-school working life (between times X and U), and the third the discounted 
value of pension benefits between retirement and the expected time of death, Z. The last term 
corresponds to the present value of the direct costs of schooling born by the agent (i.e. net of 
public subsidies). 
To calculate the rate of return to schooling, we will compute its net marginal product, which 
will be given by the derivative of the net lifetime earnings function, V'(X), and solve for the 
value of the discount rate, r, that makes this derivative equal to zero when X = Xo (i.e. for an 
individual of average attainment). Using Leibniz's rule to differentiate V(X) and keeping in 
mind that So and Ho are fixed quantities (for they refer to the average worker in the entire 
economy and not to our reference young individual), we have 
  
  
 
V' (X) = Aoe
!Ho / 2Fs (X)e
"(R+!) X "Aoe
!H o / 2µs f (So)e
"(R +! )X
             + Ao F'( X)
X
U
# e"Rt dt "F(X)e"RX
$ 
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
& 
* 
+ Aoe
(g +! "+ )U Fp' X( )e
"(R+ g+! "+ )t
U
Z
# dt
$ 
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
& 
* 
 
A bit of algebra will show that 
  (15) 
  
 
V' (X)
Aoe
!RX
= e!"Xe"Ho / 2 Fs (X) !µs f (So )[ ] ! F(X) +
1 ! e!RH
R
F' (X) + # (R)Fp' X( ){ }  
where  
  (16) 
  
 
! ( R) "
R
R + g +# $%
1 $ e$(R +g +# $% )( Z$U )
e RH $ 1
 
is the relative discount factor that must be applied to the pension component of the benefits of 
schooling before they can be compared to its wage benefits. 
Setting the derivative in (15) equal to zero when X = Xo and operating, we have: 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
  (17) 
  
 
R
1! e!RHo
=
F' (Xo ) + " (R)Fp' Xo( )
F(Xo ) ! Fs( Xo)e
!#Xoe#H o / 2[ ] + µs f (So )e!#Xo e#Ho / 2
 
This expression shows that the return to schooling is an increasing function of the ratio between 
the gain in expected net income induced by a marginal increase in school attendance and the 
cost of schooling. The denominator of this ratio can be written as the sum of an opportunity (F - 
Fs) and a direct cost component, and the numerator as the sum of two terms that capture the 
benefits that accrue respectively during the agent's working life and after retirement. Notice 
that, before being added to the wage component of the payoff to schooling, F'(), marginal 
retirement benefits (Fp') are weighted by a factor γ(R) that discounts for their later accrual and 
takes into account their potentially different growth rate (ω rather than g+ν) and expected 
duration (Z - U rather than H). 
 
Table 1: Tax and benefit parameters used in the rate of return formula 
______________________________________________________________________ 
  (18) 
  
 
!e "
T e#$Xo f (So )( )
e#$Xo f (So )
,  
  
 
!u "
T B e#$Xo f (So )( )% & ' 
( 
) 
* 
B e#$Xo f (So )( )
 , 
  
 
!s "
T (1 #$) f (So )( )
(1#$ )f (So)
, ! p "
T P e
#$Xo f (S
o
)( )( )
P e
#$Xo f (S
o
)( )
 
  (18)  
  
 
T'e ! T' e
"#Xo f (So)( ),    
  
 
T'u ! T' B e
"#X o f (So)( )$ % & 
' 
( 
) ,     T '
p
! T ' P e
"#Xo f (S
o
)( )( )  
  (19) 
  
 
b!
B e"#X o f (So )( )
e"#Xo f (So )
,  
  
 
B'! B' e"#X o f (So)( ), pb !
P e
"#Xo f (S
o
)( )
e
"#Xo f (S
o
)
, PB ' ! P ' e"#Xo f (S
o
)( )  
  (20) 
  
 
1!T'" 1!T'e( ) +
1 ! p
p
1 !T'u( )B'   #  T'" T'e !
1! p
p
1!T'u( )B'  
  (21) 
  
 
(1- ! ) " (1 #! e ) +
1 # p
p
(1 #!u )b  $   ! = ! e #
1# p
p
(1# !u )b  
  (22)   
 
! " (1# $e ) # (1# $u )b  
  (23) 
  
 
! "
f' (So )
f (So )
 
where p 
 
!  p(So).  
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
To rewrite equation (17) in a form that can be used directly in our calculations, we define the tax 
and benefit parameters listed in Table 1. The symbols τe, τu, τs and τp denote the average 
income tax rates faced by the representative employed and unemployed adult workers, student 
part-time workers and pensioners, T'e, T'u and T'p are the corresponding marginal tax rates, 
and b, pb, PB’ and B' are the average and marginal gross replacement rates for unemployed 
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workers and for pensioners.6 Grouping some of these terms we construct T', τ  and Δ  so that (T' 
and τ  are equal to zero in the absence of taxes), p(1-T') and p(1-τ) are the expected marginal and 
average net-of-tax factors for adult workers, and Δ  captures the difference in net earnings 
between employed and unemployed adult workers. Finally θ is the Mincerian returns 
parameter commonly estimated in microeconometric wage equation studies, and it measures 
the impact of schooling on gross wages. 
It is easy to check that  
  (24)   
 
F( Xo) =   
 
p(1- ! )e"#X o f (So)  
  (25)   
 
Fs (Xo ) =   
 
ps( 1! " s )( 1!#) f (So )  
  (26) 
  
 
Fp (Xo ) = (1! " p )pbe
!#Xo f (S
o
)      
  (27) Fp '(Xo ) = 1! T 'p( )PB 'e!"Xo f '(So )S '(Xo )!" f (So )[ ]  
  (28)   
 
F' (Xo )   
 
= p 1 !T'( )e!"Xo f '(So)S'(Xo ) !"f (So )[ ] + p'S'( Xo )#e
!"X o f (So)  
where it should be understood that p(), p'() and ps() are evaluated at So = S(Xo). Notice that the 
components of F'(Xo) and FP'(Xo)  that capture the marginal increase in wages or pensions due 
to schooling include a negative term of the form -νf(So). This is so because an extra year spent in 
school means one less year of experience, and this has a permanent effect on earnings that 
partially offsets the wage increase due to education, which is captured by the term f'(So)S'(Xo). 
Using these expressions, equation (17) becomes 
  
(29)
R
1! e! RHo
=
p 1! T '( ) "S '(X
o
)!#[ ] + $p 'S '(Xo )+ % (R) 1! T 'p( )PB ' "S '(Xo )!#[ ]
p(1-& )!'p(1!()(1! &
s
)e
#Ho / 2)* +, + µse
#Ho / 2
                       -
"
net
+ p '
net
+ PENS
OPPC + DIRC
- R '
 
Hence, (by (14)) the private rate of return to schooling is given by 
  (30) rp = Rp + g + ν 
where g is the growth rate of average wages, ν  the contribution of experience to the growth of 
individual wages over the lifecycle and Rp is the value of R that solves equation (29).7 
                                                
6 Notice that pb is the gross replacement ratio at the time of retirement. Using equations (1) and (9), we see 
that pb = PU/WU. 
7 The above calculations assume that unemployment benefits are set as a function of gross income in 
employment. This is so in most countries, but there are two exceptions. Germany and Austria set benefits 
as a fixed fraction (β) of net-of-tax income in employment and do not tax them. It is shown in Appendix 2 
that equation (29) continues to hold in this case provided we redefine T', τ and Δ as follows: 
  (20') 
  
 
1!T'" 1 +
1! p
p
#
$ 
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 1!T'e( )  (21')  
  
 
(1- ! ) " 1 +
1 # p
p
$
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
* ( 1# !e )   and 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
To interpret equation (29), notice that its left-hand side is an increasing function of R where the 
term 1-e-RHo that appears in the denominator serves to adjust for the fact that the "useful life" of 
the asset (the working life of the individual, Ho) is finite. The right-hand side, R', is simply the 
ratio of the marginal benefits derived from an additional year of schooling (which we can 
interpret as the "dividend" paid by human capital) to its cost, with all terms expressed as 
fractions of the initial gross earnings of an adult employed worker with average education, Ae-
νXof(So). The first term in the numerator (θnet) captures the expected increase in after-tax 
earnings and unemployment benefits holding the probability of employment constant and 
taking into account the opportunity cost of losing a year of experience to remain in school. The 
second term (p'net) measures the gain in expected net earnings that comes from an increase in 
the probability of employment holding wages constant, and the third one gives the discounted 
value of the increase in expected retirement benefits. Notice that, except for the experience 
offsets, all these terms are directly proportional to the marginal productivity of time spent at 
school, S'(Xo). The denominator measures the total cost of an additional year of schooling as the 
sum of two terms. The first one (OPPC) is the opportunity cost of school attendance (net 
foregone wages), and the second one (DIRC) the direct costs of schooling born by the student or 
his family. 
Public policies influence the private return to schooling in many ways. Educational subsidies or 
the direct public provision of educational services at no charge will raise the return to schooling 
by lowering its direct cost to the individual (DIRC). Pension benefits will also raise rp, provided 
of course they are linked to wages (which is not always the case in our sample). The effect of 
taxation is more complicated. Notice that a proportional income tax (i.e. a tax system in which 
  
 
Te ' = Tu' = Tp' = ! e = !u = ! s ) would have absolutely no effect on the return to schooling 
whenever there are no direct costs (i.e. when DIRC = 0) because taxes would then reduce both 
the costs and the benefits of education in the same proportion. Hence, the effects of the tax 
system will come from differences among the tax rates that enter the formula and from their 
interaction with the direct cost term, DIRC. Under a proportional tax system, an increase in the 
(single) tax rate will reduce R' if DIRC > 0 and increase it otherwise (that is, if students receive a 
net subsidy) because higher taxes will reduce the benefits of education in a greater proportion 
that its costs in the first case, and by a smaller one in the second. 
When we abandon the proportionality assumption, changes in marginal and average tax rates 
have different effects. An increase in either   
 
Te ' ,  Tu' or   
 
Tp' reduces the return to schooling by 
lowering the net wage gains term, θnet, or the value of retirement benefits, PENS. An increase in 
student taxes, 
  
 
!s , also reduces R' by increasing the opportunity cost of schooling, OPPC. An 
increase in 
  
 
!u , however, raises the incentive to invest in education because it increases the 
                                                                                                                                          
  (22')   
 
! " (1# $e )( 1# %)  
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earnings premium on being employed, p'net, and lowers the opportunity cost of studying. 
Finally, an increase in the average tax rate on employed workers, 
  
 
!e , reduces both p'net and 
OPPC. The net effect will be an increase in the rate of return whenever R' > S'p'/p, a condition 
which holds in all the countries in the sample we will consider below. 
An important special case is the one where schooling has no employment benefits or direct 
costs (that is µs  =   p'= 0), there are no retirement benefits and students do not work part-time (φ 
= 1). In this case, the tax system affects the returns to schooling only through its progressivity at 
the average wage level: as the tax system becomes more progressive (i.e. as the ratio (1-Te')/(1-
τe) declines), the incentive to invest in education falls. This is a useful benchmark because in 
practice it is not a bad approximation to the situation in many countries, where the 
employment-related effects of schooling and its direct costs are relatively unimportant, at least 
after government intervention. 
Finally, the effects of the average and marginal gross unemployment replacement ratios are also 
different. Raising B' increases the return to schooling through θnet, while raising b reduces the 
return both by lowering p'net and by increasing OPPC. Under a flat-rate benefit system (with B' 
= b), an increase in benefits is likely to reduce the return to schooling for realistic parameter 
values.8   
 
 3. Effective tax rates on schooling 
To quantify the contribution of various forms of government intervention to the private return 
to schooling, it will be useful to compute the rate of return under a set of different 
counterfactual assumptions or scenarios. We will consider five such scenarios, starting from a 
hypothetical situation in which there is no government intervention and then adding various 
policies one by one. In scenario [1] (NO GOV'T) we assume that private agents pay the full costs 
of education and there are no taxes or social benefits. In scenario [2] we introduce subsidies to 
education and the public provision of schooling free of charge, maintaining the remaining 
assumptions. In [3] we introduce personal taxes, in [4] unemployment and housing benefits and 
in [5] pensions to arrive at our most comprehensive measure of the observed private returns to 
education (OBS). Table 2 summarizes these hypotheses. In what follows, we will refer to 
estimates of rp obtained under the assumptions of the NO GOV'T and OBS scenarios as raw and 
all-in returns respectively. 
The rate of return estimates obtained under the different scenarios will be used to construct a 
set of effective tax and subsidy rates that measure the impact of public policies on private 
incentives to invest in education. We calculate the tax or subsidy wedge (wedgegov’t) generated by 
public policies as the difference between the raw and all-in rates of return, and define the 
effective tax rate on schooling (etrgov’t) as the ratio between the tax wedge and the raw return. 
                                                
8 The condition for this is   
 
(1 ! p)(1 !Tu ' )"' < ( 1! #u ) p'S' +(1 ! p)R'[ ] , which again holds for all the 
countries in the sample. 
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Table 2: Assumptions underlying the scenarios 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 raw return 
NO GOV'T 
educational 
subsidies 
personal 
taxes 
unemployment 
benefits 
all-in return 
OBS 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
direct costs total private private private private 
taxes none none observed observed observed 
unempl. benefits none none none observed observed 
pensions none none none none observed 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Letting ri denote the estimated rate of return to schooling under scenario i, we have 
  (31) 
  
 
wedgegov't = rno gov't ! robs      and       
  
 
etrgov't =
wedgegov't
rno gov' t
. 
Notice that 
  
 
wedgegov't  and   
 
etrgov't  capture the joint effect of all the public policies we are 
considering. To isolate the impact of each individual policy, it will be useful to write 
  
 
wedgegov't  
and 
  
 
etrgov't  as the sum of four factors that capture the separate effects of educational subsidies, 
personal taxes and unemployment and pension benefits as follows. First, we write 
  
 
wedgegov't  in 
the form 
  (32)  
wedgegov ' t = rno  gov ' t ! robs = (r
no  gov ' t
! rsubs )+ (rsubs ! rtaxes )+ (rtaxes ! r
ben
)+ (r
ben
! robs )
                 " !wedgesubs + wedgetax + wedgeben ! wedgepens
 
Dividing through by 
  
 
rno gov' t , the corresponding partial tax and subsidy rates are given by 
  (33)  
etrgov ' t =
wedgegov ' t
rno  gov ' t
=
!wedgesubs + wedgetax + wedgeben ! wedgepens
rno  gov ' t
          " !subsedu + etrtax + etrben ! subspens
 
Notice that the partial wedges and rates are defined so that their signs are positive under 
normal circumstances, that is, whenever taxes and unemployment benefits reduce the private 
return to schooling and educational subsidies and pensions increase it.  
 
 An alternative decomposition of the tax rate on schooling 
To gain some additional insight into the factors that affect the different components of the 
effective tax rate on schooling, it will be useful to construct an alternative decomposition of this 
variable. Let us denote by R'obs the right-hand side of the rate of return formula given in 
equation (29), 
   (35) Robs ' =
p 1! T '( ) "S '(X
o
)!#[ ] + $p 'S '(Xo )+ % (R) 1! T 'p( )PB ' "S '(Xo )!#[ ]
p(1-& )!'p(1!()(1! &
s
)e#Ho / 2)* +, + µse
#Ho / 2
                     
. 
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It will be convenient to divide both the numerator and the denominator of R'obs by p(1-τ) so as 
to express all terms as fractions of the expected after-tax income of an active adult worker. As 
shown in Appendix 2, this yields an alternative expression for R'obs of the following form 
  (36) R
obs
' =
(1! " )# '+ (1! $)% '+ PENS '
1!&(1!')
1! (
s
1-(
e
)H
o
/2*
+,
-
./
+
µ
s
p(1-( )
e
)H
o
/2
= (1! " )# '+ (1! $)% '+ PENS '
OPPC '+ DIRC '
 
where 
  PENS ' = ! (R)1" T 'p
p(1-# )
PB ' $S '"%( )  
The parameters θ' and ε'  that appear in the numerator of this expression are defined as 
  (37)  
 
!'" !S' (Xo ) #$  
and 
  (38) 
  
 
!'"
p'(So )
p(So)
S' (Xo )  
and measure the marginal contribution of schooling to expected income working respectively 
through the wage and employment channels. The other two coefficients that enter the 
numerator of R'obs, π  and ρ, can be interpreted as the tax rates on these two components of the 
return to schooling. The first one, 
  (39) 
  
 
! "
(1 #$u )b
p(1- $ )
 , 
is the net replacement rate measured as a fraction of the expected net earnings of an active adult 
worker (rather than as a fraction of income in employment as this variable is commonly 
defined),9  and the second, 
  (40) 
  
 
! " 1 #
1 #T'
1# $
=
T'#$
1 #$
, 
is an index of the progressivity of the tax system. 
Using equation (36), we will now construct an approximate decomposition of the overall tax 
rate on schooling (excluding pensions). The values of R' corresponding to the NO GOV'T and 
OBS scenarios can be written in the form 
  
  
 
R'no gov't =
!' +"'
C
   and   R 'obs =
(1! " )# '+ (1! $)% '+ PENS '
(1! s)C
 
                                                
9 In the case of Germany and Austria, where (non-taxable) benefits are set as a fixed fraction, β, of net 
income in employment, the net replacement ratio is given by 
         (39')
  
 
! "
#
p +(1- p)#
 
and equation (36) continues to hold as written. 
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where C = OPPC' + DIRC' in the no-government scenario and s is the overall subsidy rate on 
total schooling costs, taking into account the effect of taxes and unemployment benefits on the 
opportunity cost of education. 
Let us now define a new measure of the overall tax rate, t, by working directly with these two 
terms as    
 (41)  
  
 
t !
R'no gov't "R'obs
R'no gov't
= 1"
R'obs
R'no gov't
 
It should be clear that t will not coincide with the effective tax rate defined above (
  
 
etrgov't ) but 
the intuition will carry over since r is an increasing transformation of R'. (In our sample, the 
correlation between t and 
  
 
etrgov't  is 0.98).  
We now observe that 
  (42) 1! t = R 'obs
R '
no  gov ' t
=
(1! " )# '+ (1! $)% '+ PENS '
(1! s)C
# '+ % '
C
=
1
1! s
1! "( )
# '
# '+ % '
+ 1! $( )
% '
# '+ % '
+
PENS '
# '+ % '
&
'(
)
*+
 
Hence, the overall net-of-tax factor, 1-t, is the product of an increasing function of the subsidy 
rate, s, and a term that is the sum of the weighted average of the net-of-tax factors on the wage 
and employment components of the return to schooling, with weights that are proportional to 
the shares of these components in the total return, and a term that captures the discounted 
value of marginal pension benefits (which could be subsumed in the first term, since it is also 
proportional to θ'). Notice that the "tax rate" on the wage component of the returns to schooling 
is our measure of progressivity, π , and that on the employment component is the modified net 
replacement rate, ρ.  The first of these terms, in turn, can be decomposed into two parts that 
reflect, respectively, the progressivity of the tax and benefit schedules faced by employed and 
by unemployed workers. Letting πe and πu denote the partial progressivity measures for 
employed and unemployed workers, which are defined by 
  (43)   
  
 
1!"e #
1!T'e
1! $e
   and   
  
 
1!"u #
(1 !T'u )B'
(1 !$u )b
, 
it is easy to show that10  
  (44)   
 
! = !e + ( 1" p)# !u "!e( ) . 
Hence, unemployment benefit parameters will affect π as well as ρ and their introduction may 
raise the overall tax rate, t, through an increase in average progressivity, especially in those 
countries where unemployment rates, approximated by 1-p, are high. This effect will be 
particularly strong  when unemployment compensation is paid at a fixed rate or benefit ceilings 
                                                
10 See Appendix 2. 
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are binding, since that makes the marginal tax rate on additional schooling equal to 100% for 
the unemployed. 
 
 4. The fiscal return to schooling 
By raising wages and employment probabilities, public expenditure on education increases 
future tax revenues and pension liabilities and is likely to reduce expenditure on 
unemployment benefits. Proceeding as in section 2, we can treat such expenditure as an 
investment that generates a stream of net public revenues over the agent's lifecycle and 
compute a fiscal rate of return to schooling that will summarize the long-term impact of 
educational spending on government finances. This variable, which we will denote by rf, will be 
defined as the discount rate that equates the present value of public schooling expenditure 
(which includes an opportunity cost component as school attendance reduces wage income and 
hence current tax payments) with the present value of the induced incremental flows of tax 
revenues and savings on social protection payments. This fiscal rate of return can also be 
interpreted as the maximum real rate of interest at which the government can borrow to finance 
educational expenditure without increasing the present value of current and future deficits. In 
addition, we will also compute the net present fiscal value of an additional year of schooling, 
defined as the difference in present value terms between incremental net fiscal revenues and 
public educational expenditures.  
We will consider the streams of net tax revenues associated with adult and student workers and 
with pensioners. In addition to the personal taxes considered in the previous section, we will 
now take into account social security contributions by employers and consumption taxes. The 
tax revenue per efficiency unit of labour generated by an adult worker of schooling X is given 
by the difference between the benefits that accrue to him and the direct and indirect taxes paid 
by him directly or by his employer on his behalf, that is, by 
  (40) 
  
 
Ge (X) ! T e
"#X f S(X)[ ]( ) + $ cC e"#X f S(X)[ ] "T e"#X f S( X)[ ]( )% & ' 
( 
) * + E e
"#X f S( X)[ ]( )  
when employed and by 
 (41) 
  
 
Gu ( X) ! "B e
"#X f S(X)[ ]( ) + T B e"#X f S( X)[ ]( )$ % & 
' 
( ) + * cC B e
"#X f S(X)[ ]( ) "T B e"#X f S(X)[ ]( )$ % & 
' 
( ) 
$ 
% & 
' 
( ) 
 
when unemployed. In these expressions, the function T() captures personal taxes on workers, 
including employee social security contributions, as a function of their gross income, E() 
denotes social contributions paid by employers, C() gives consumption as a function of after-tax 
income, and τc is the tax rate on consumption. Notice that T(), E() and C()  all give amounts per 
efficiency unit of labour. 
Since the wages of adult workers grow at a rate g+ν, the expected net tax revenue generated  by 
an adult agent at time t will be given by 
  (42)   
 
Aoe
(g +! )tG(X) " q S(X)[ ] p S(X)[ ]Ge (X) + 1 # p S(X)[ ]( )Gu (X){ } Aoe
(g +! )t  
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where q() gives the probability that the agent will be active as a function of his attainment level 
and p() the probability that he is employed, conditional on his being active. Notice that the 
participation rate is relevant for our calculations here because only those students that become 
active pay taxes or are entitled to unemployment benefits or (in most countries) to pensions.  
Similarly, the expected net tax revenue generated at time t by a student with schooling X is 
given by 
   
  
 
(43) Aoe
gte!Ho / 2Gs (X) " qs S(X)[ ]ps S(X)[ ]Aoe
gte!H o / 2
             * T ( 1#$) f S(X)( )( ) + E ( 1#$) f S(X)( )( ) + % cC (1 #$) f S(X)( ) #T (1#$ ) f S( X)( )( )[ ]{ }
 
where qs() = ηqq()  gives the probability of participation of a student of attainment S(X), that is, 
the probability that he will be seeking a part-time job while attending school. Finally, the total 
net tax revenue generated by a pensioner of schooling X will be given by 
(44) A
o
e
(g+! "# )U
e
# t
G
p
X( ) $ A
o
e
(g+! "# )U
e
# t
*
                             "P f S(X)( )e"!X( ) + T P f S(X)( )e"!X( )%& '( + ) cC P f S(X)( )e
"!X( )" T P f S(X)( )e"!X( )%& '(%& '({ }
The present value of the expected stream of tax revenues (net of unemployment and pension 
benefits and public expenditure on education) associated with a worker of achievement S(X) 
can be written 
  (45) Vg(X) = 
  
 
Aoe
!Ho / 2Gs (t )
0
X
" e#(R+! )tdt  + 
  
 
AoG( X)
X
U
! e"Rt dt  -   
 
µg
0
X
! Aoe"Ho / 2 f (So)e#(R +" )t dt  
     +
  
 
q S( X)[ ]Gp (X)Aoe
(g +! "# )U
U
Z
$ e"(R+ g+! "# )tdt  
where R ≡ r - g - ν , r is the discount rate, and 
  
 
µgAte
!Ho / 2 f (So )  is annual government 
expenditure per student. Notice that the pension term, Gp(), enters the equation multiplied by 
q(), since we assume that only active workers are entitled to (contributory) retirement benefits. 
Differentiating Vg (), and setting the result equal to zero when X = Xo it is easily shown that the 
fiscal rate of return on schooling is given by  
  (46)  rf = Rf + g + ν  
where Rf  is the value of R that solves the following equation 
  (47)  
  
 
R
1! e!RHo
=
G'(Xo ) + " ( R) q'S'( Xo)Gp( Xo) + qGp' (Xo )[ ]
G( Xo) !Gs (Xo )e
!#Xo e#Ho / 2[ ] + µg f (So )e!#X oe#Ho / 2
 
and γ(R) has been defined above in 
  (16) 
  
 
! ( R) "
R
R + g +# $%
1 $ e$(R +g +# $% )( Z$U )
e RHo $ 1
. 
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Table 3: Parameters used in the fiscal returns formula 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 (48)  
  
 
cs !
C ( 1" #s )(1 "$) f (So )[ ]
(1 "# s )( 1"$ ) f (So)
  
  
 
ce !
C (1 "#e )e
"$X o f (So )[ ]
( 1" #e )e
"$Xo f (So )
    
   
  
 
cu !
C ( 1" #u )be
"$Xo f (So )[ ]
(1 "#u )be
"$Xo f (So )
   cp !
C (1" # p )pbe
"$Xo f (S
o
)%& '(
(1" # p )pbe
"$Xo f (S
o
)
 
 (49)  
  
 
C'e ! C' ( 1" #e )e
"$Xo f (So )[ ]    
  
 
C'u ! C' (1 "#u )be
"$Xo f (So )[ ]   C 'p ! C ' (1" # p )pbe"$Xo f (So )%& '( , 
  (50) 
  
 
e s !
E ( 1"#) f (So )[ ]
(1 "#) f (So )
   
  
 
ee !
E e"#Xo f (So )[ ]
e"#X o f (So )
   and  
  
 
E'e ! E' e
"#Xo f (So)( ). 
  (51)   
 
Ts ! " s + " c cs (1 #" s ) + es    
  (52) T
p
! "(1" #
p
)(1" #
c
c
p
)pb   ! '
p
" #(1# $
c
C '
p
)(1# T
p
')PB '  
  (53)   
 
Te ! " e + " c ce (1 #" e ) + ee     
 
!'e " T'e + 1#T'e( )$ cC'e +E'e  
  (54)   
 
Tu ! "(1 "# c cu )( 1" #u )b     
 
!'u " # 1- $ cC'u( ) 1#T'u( )B'  
  (55)   
 
Ta = pTe + 1 ! p( )Tu      
 
!'a " p!'e + 1# p( )!'u        
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Proceeding as in section 2, we will rewrite equation (47) in terms of a more convenient set of 
parameters. (The detailed calculations are in Appendix 2.b). The relevant coefficients are 
defined in Table 3 and include the average and marginal propensities to consume out of after-
tax income of students, pensioners and adult employed and unemployed workers (ci and C'i 
with i =  s, p, e,  u), and the average and marginal rates of employers' social security 
contributions for employed adult and student workers (ee, es and E'e) and a set of marginal (Δ'i) 
and average (Ti) total tax rates for the different types of agents that capture the combined effect 
of the different types of taxes and of unemployment and retirement benefits.11 
Looking at equation (53), for instance, Te, is the fraction of the gross income of an employed 
adult worker that is paid in taxes either by himself or by his employer. This variable is the sum 
of the average rates of personal income tax and employer contributions to social security plus 
the result of applying the consumption tax rate to the fraction of after-tax income that is 
consumed. The term Ta measures the expected net tax revenue generated by an active adult 
worker, that is, the difference between taxes paid when employed (Te) and net benefits received 
                                                
11 In the case of Germany and Austria, the average and marginal total tax rates for unemployed workers 
will be given by 
   
 
Tu ! "(1 "# c cu )( 1" #e )$      and       
 
!'u " # 1 #$ cCu '( ) 1#Te'( )%   
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when unemployed (-Tu), both weighted by their respective probabilities. Similarly, Δ'a captures 
the expected increase in net tax revenues per active worker that is generated by a marginal 
increase in his attainment level, S. Both of these expressions can be either positive or negative 
depending on employment probabilities and tax and benefit levels. The total tax rates on 
unemployed workers and pensioners (Tu and Tp), on the other hand, are always negative, since 
government transfers are assumed to be their only source of income. 
Using this notation, equation (47) becomes  
(56) 
  
 
R
1! e!RHo
= Rf' "
Ta
q'
q
S' +#'a $' + Te !Tu( )p'S'
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
* + + (R) Tp
q'
q
S' +#'p$'
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
* 
Ta !,qpsTs (1 !-)e
.H o / 2[ ] +
µg
q
e.H o / 2
"
N1 + + ( R)N2
D
 
where q(), q'() and p'() are all evaluated at So, ηq = qs/q and θ' = θS'- ν. The remaining variables 
have the same meaning as in section 2 (although some adjustments will have to be made in 
their values to approximate general equilibrium effects, as will be discussed below). It is also 
easy to show that  the net present fiscal value of a year of schooling, calculated as of time Xo (i.e. 
when the representative individual leaves school), can be approximated by 
  (57) NPFV(ro) =    
 
Vg' (Xo )e
ro Xo =  
                
  
 
= N1
1! e!( ro !g !" )Ho
ro ! g !"
+N 2e
!( ro !g !" )Ho
1 ! e
!( ro !# )( Z!U )
ro !#
!D
$ 
% 
& 
' & 
( 
) 
& 
* & 
qe!"Ho / 2Wo  
where ro is the discount rate, Wo the average gross salary of a full-time worker with average 
schooling and N1, N2 and D have been defined in (56).  
Equation (56) has essentially the same interpretation as the private returns formula given in 
section 2. That is, rf  is an increasing function of the growth rate of wages over the lifecycle and 
of the ratio of the marginal (fiscal) benefits of an additional year of schooling to its (budgetary) 
costs, adjusted for the finiteness of working lives. We have written Rf' so that all its cost and 
benefit components are measured as fractions of an adult worker's gross wages.  
The numerator of Rf' in equation (56) measures the expected net annual contribution to the 
public budget of an additional year of schooling. Its first term captures the impact of an increase 
in the labour force participation rate. Since inactive workers have no labour income that can be 
taxed and are not entitled to unemployment benefits, increasing the labour force participation 
rate will increase net tax revenues provided tax payments by newly active workers exceed on 
average the social benefits paid to them. The second term, Δa'θ', captures the net revenue effects 
of higher salaries, which increase tax payments by employed workers but also the benefit 
entitlements of the unemployed. The third term, (Te-Tu)p'S', reflects the impact of the increase 
in the probability of employment and is unambiguously positive since greater employment 
implies both higher tax revenues and lower unemployment payments (recall that Tu is always 
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negative). Finally, the pension-related terms that appear in the numerator are weighted by the 
same discount factor as in the private returns calculation and are both negative, as pension 
liabilities will increase both with the rate of labour force participation and with wages. 
The denominator of Rf' is the sum of the opportunity and direct budget costs of schooling. The 
opportunity cost term is the difference between expected net tax receipts from a full-time 
worker and net receipts from a part-time student worker. The direct cost component, finally, is 
equal to government expenditure per student divided by the labour force participation rate. 
This correction is required because expenditure is incurred for all students, but only those that 
enter the labour force pay taxes on labour income or are entitled to unemployment benefits. 
 
 5. Data and parameter values 
This section gathers together the data required to calculate the private and fiscal returns to post-
compulsory schooling in the member countries of the European Union with the exception of 
Luxembourg, for which some of the required data are not available. These rates of return will 
be calculated by applying the formulas derived in the previous sections to a representative 
individual for each country endowed with average school attainment. We will assume that this 
representative agent's income, when employed, is equal to the gross earnings of the average 
production worker (APW) as estimated by the OECD.12 When computing the private rate of 
return, it will also be assumed that the agent is active throughout his working life -- that is, that 
he is active while attending school at post-compulsory levels and remains a member of the 
labour force until the average retirement age. Hence, the employment probabilities and related 
parameters used in this calculation are conditional on labour force participation. For the 
estimation of the fiscal returns, we will also take into account the effect of education on the 
probability of participation in the labour force of the representative individual.  
To calculate the taxes on labour income to which the individual of reference would be subject in 
each country (including national and regional income taxes and social security contributions) 
and the unemployment, housing and retirement benefits for which he would be eligible, we 
have assumed that i) he is single and has no children (so as to abstract from cross-country 
differences in family support policies), and ii) that any unemployment spells he suffers are 
relatively short-lived and do not exhaust contributive benefits. 
Our estimates of private returns will be obtained under partial equilibrium assumptions, that is, 
taking as given the aggregate level of schooling and factor prices. To calculate fiscal returns, on 
the other hand, we will try to approximate general equilibrium conditions. This will require 
adjustments that will reduce the values of some of the key parameters (in particular, θ, p'and 
q'), as will be discussed in section 7 below. 
 
                                                
12 This assumption is made for convenience, as it allows us to make use of the estimates of APW earnings 
and of the relevant tax rates that are provided by the OECD for all countries in the sample. It should be 
noted, however, that this is not necessarily a good approximation, for average wages and skill levels in 
manufacturing may differ from those in the overall economy. 
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Table 4: Parameter values used in the calculation of the private  
and fiscal return on schooling  
______________________________________________________________________ 
g = 1%, growth rate of average real wages. Source: AMECO Database, European Commission, 
DG for Economic and Financial Affairs. 
ν = 1.38%, percentage increase in real wages with each year of experience. See footnote no. 13. 
1−φ = 0.2, part-time student earnings as a fraction of APW wages. 
ce = C'e = 0.8, average and marginal propensities to consume out of after-tax income for 
employed adult workers. 
cs = 1, average propensity to consume of employed students. 
cu = C'u = cp = C'p = 0.9, average and marginal propensities to consume of unemployed adult 
workers and pensioners. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Tables 4 and 5 define the variables and parameters used in the computation of the private and 
fiscal rates of return to schooling and gives their sources. We have set the growth rate of 
average real wages in the economy (g) to 1%. This is the observed average annual growth rate 
of real compensation per employee in the EU15 between 1981 and 2000. The experience 
component of the growth rate of individual wages over the lifecycle (ν) has been set at 1.38% 
per annum. This figure has been obtained as the constant growth rate that better approximates 
the quadratic experience-earnings profile estimated for a typical EU country.13 We have also 
assumed that student earnings from part-time work are 20% of the wages of an adult worker of 
average attainment and experience. Finally, we assign what we consider conservative values to 
the average and marginal propensities to consume of different types of workers (ci and C'i with 
i = e, u, s, p for employed and unemployed adult workers, students and pensioners, 
respectively). 
Our estimates of the direct costs of schooling (µ,  µs and µg) are based on data on expenditure on 
secondary and higher education taken from recent issues of the OECD's Education at a Glance. 
These variables try to approximate the (total, private and public) cost per student of a marginal 
increase in enrollments, which would have to come at the upper secondary and university  
                                                
13 We estimate ν by fitting a linear trend to the wage-experience profile predicted by a set of Mincerian 
regressions. Since HWW do not report the coefficients of potential experience and its square we proceed as 
follows. First, we estimate a Mincerian wage regression with 1996 ECHP data for those countries for which 
hourly wages can be recovered. We use the estimated coefficients of potential experience and its square to 
construct the time profile of the experience premium (in log terms) and regress it on a linear trend for each 
country. The slope coefficient of this regression provides a preliminary estimate of ν  for each country. We 
calculate the ratio of this quantity to the estimate of θ from the same regression (which is different from 
the one used in our calculations), and average these ratios across countries, obtaining a value of 0.1927. We 
then multiply this value by the average value of θ  in our sample (after correcting it for the likely net bias). 
This gives a value of 1.38%, which is our final estimate for ν. 
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Table 5: Variables used in the calculation of the private  
rate of return on schooling and sources of the data 
______________________________________________________________________ 
µs and µg = private and government expenditure per student and year, measured as a fraction 
of APW gross earnings. Source: Education at a Glance. See section 1 of Appendix 1. 
µ and µg' = total expenditure per student and year, net and gross of government grants for non-
tuition purposes, measured as a fraction of APW gross earnings. Source: Education at a 
Glance. See section 1 of Appendix 1. 
Wo = gross wage of the average production worker (APW) in 2000. Measured in US dollars 
using current exchange rates. Source: OECD (2001). 
θ = Mincerian returns to schooling parameter. Source: constructed using estimates for 1995 
taken from Harmon, Walker and Westergaard-Nielsen (2001) and other authors. 
p, p' = probability of employment after leaving school, conditional on participation in the labour 
force, and derivative of p with respect to school attainment. Source: estimated using 
individual data from ECHP. 
ps =  probability of employment while attending school, conditional on participation in the 
labour force. We estimate it as ps = ηp, where η is defined below. 
η  = correction factor capturing the greater difficulty of finding part-time employment while 
attending school. Source: calculated as the ratio between the probability of employment of  
those enrolled in education and those not enrolled in education among active workers aged 
20 to 24, using data for 1998 from Education at a Glance 2000. See section 3 of Appendix 1. 
q, qs, q' and ηq = probability of labour force participation of adult workers and students, 
derivative of the first variable with respect to school attainment and adjustment factor for 
students. Constructed using the same sources and procedure as p, ps, p' and η . 
τe and Te' = average and marginal tax rates on labour income (including national and regional 
income taxes and employee social security contributions) applicable in 2000 to a single 
employed worker earning APW wages. Source: OECD Tax database. 
τs = average tax rate on student earnings from part-time work, estimated as the tax rate on 
labour income applicable in 2000 to a single worker earning 20% of the APW salary. Source: 
estimated using OECD (2001). 
τu and Tu' = average and marginal tax rates on unemployment and housing benefits applicable 
to a single worker earning APW wages prior to the loss of employment. Source: estimated 
using OECD (2000).  
τp and Tp'  = average and marginal tax rates on pensioners at the midpoint of the retirement 
period. Source: estimated using OECD (2001 and 2005). See Section 2 of Appendix 1. 
pb  = gross pension replacement rate at the time of retirement (= initial pension before tax/gross 
wage at retirement). Source: OECD (2005). See Section 2 of Appendix 1. 
PB’ = marginal gross pension replacement ratio (increase in initial benefits resulting from a 
marginal increase in average income). Source: estimated using OECD (2005). See Section 2 of 
Appendix 1. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 5: Variables used in the calculation of the private  
rate of return on schooling and sources of the data -- continued 
______________________________________________________________________ 
ω   = rate at which a worker's pension grows over time in real terms. Source: OECD (2005). See 
Section 2 of Appendix 1. 
τc = Consumption tax rate. Source: Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000). 
ee and E'e = average and marginal rates of employer social security contributions (expressed as 
a fraction of gross wages rather than total labour costs) applicable to a single employed 
worker earning APW wages. Source: OECD Tax database. 
es = average rate of employer social security contributions for part-time student work. 
Estimated  using the OECD Tax database. 
b and B' = average and marginal gross replacement ratio. The average gross replacement ratio is 
defined as the ratio of gross unemployment and housing benefits to gross income in 
employment. Source: OECD (2000). 
β = net replacement ratio (ratio of unemployment benefits to net after-tax earnings while 
employed). This is calculated for countries where benefits are linked to after-tax earnings in 
employment (and are not taxed). Source: OECD (2000). 
S'(Xo) = expected increase in schooling (measured in completed grades) per additional year 
spent in school. Estimated using OECD data on school survival probabilities as discussed in 
section 4 of Appendix 1. 
So = average years of school attainment of the adult (over 25) population in 1990. Source: de la 
Fuente and Doménech (2006). 
Xo = years required to complete average attainment. See section 4 of Appendix 1. 
U  = Average retirement age in 1995. Source: Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999). 
H = U - Max(6+Xo, 14) = estimated length of the (post-school) working life of the representative 
individual. 
Z = Life expectancy at birth in 2000. Source: Eurostat. Calculated as a weighted average of male 
and female life expectancies with weights given by each sex's share in total employment. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
levels since attendance at lower levels is already compulsory in the EU. Public expenditure (µg) 
includes the operating costs of public educational institutions (net of research expenditure by 
universities), subsidies to private centers and two types of subsidies to households: tuition-
related grants and cash subsidies that help defray living expenses and other costs. The private 
(household) expenditure indicator (µs) captures the net costs paid by families and is shown net 
of government transfers (which makes them negative in quite a few European countries). We do 
not take into account expenditure on books, school materials, lodging or transportation. Total 
expenditure (µ) is calculated as the sum of public and private expenditure (plus expenditure by 
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enterprises on apprenticeship programmes in the case of Germany)14 and is shown net of non-
tuition grants, which we consider a transfer of income to the private sector rather than a real 
resource cost of education.  We also calculate total expenditure inclusive of non-tuition grants. 
This variable will be denoted by µg' because we will use it in our calculation of fiscal returns as 
an estimate of the budgetary cost per student of an increase in attainment financed entirely by 
the government, holding constant the observed level of non-tuition subsidies. 
All our indicators of the direct costs of schooling are weighted averages of expenditure per 
student at the secondary and tertiary levels and are measured as a fraction of the gross earnings 
of the average production worker (Wo). We use weights of 2/3 and 1/3 for secondary and 
tertiary schooling respectively to try to capture the impact of a marginal change in upper 
secondary attainment under the assumption that half of the new graduates will go on to 
university. 
 Mincerian returns 
A key input to our calculations is the Mincerian returns to schooling parameter (θ) that 
measures the percentage increase in gross wages (wages before income taxes and employee 
social security contributions) resulting from an additional year of schooling. Seeking a balance 
between the reliability of individual estimates and cross-country comparability, we have 
constructed a set of estimates for this parameter using the results of microeconometric wage 
regressions reported in Harmon, Walker and Westergaard-Nielsen (HWW, 2001), de la Fuente, 
Doménech and Jimeno (2003), de la Croix and Vandenberghe (2003) and Ciccone (2004).15 
The first of these sources is the introduction to a collective volume summarizing the results of  a 
large research project on the returns to education in Europe known as PURE (Public funding and 
private returns to education) that was sponsored by the European Commission. In this paper, 
HWW use relatively homogeneous data on hourly wages provided by the project's national 
teams to estimate the Mincerian returns parameter (θ) using a common econometric 
specification. For each country, they estimate separate wage equations for men and women 
controlling for potential experience (i.e. time since the completion of education) and the square 
of this variable. For the eight countries in our EU sample for which HWW provide estimates 
based on data on gross wages, our estimate of θ  is obtained by averaging their male and female 
estimates, weighting them by the share of each sex in total employment (using data from the 
2000 Labour Force Survey provided by Eurostat). 
                                                
14 Educational expenditure by enterprises only appears to be significant in Germany, where the bulk of 
non-public spending on secondary education corresponds to contributions by business firms to 
apprenticeship programmes. (We thank L. Wössman for pointing this out). 
15 One alternative we have explored is to estimate the Mincerian parameter using data from the European 
Community Household Panel Survey (ECHP). However, this source has some serious disadvantages 
relative to the national data sets used in the studies cited above that in our view more than outweigh the 
potential advantages of using a common data source. In particular, the breakdown of the population by 
educational attainment is generally much coarser than in national sources, sample sizes are considerably 
smaller in many cases, and hourly wages cannot be recovered for all countries.  
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The remaining countries are Belgium, for which  HWW provide no results, and a set of five 
countries (Austria, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain) for which the data used by HWW 
refer to net rather than gross wages (i.e. to wages after personal income taxes and employee 
social security contributions have been witheld). For Spain, Belgium and Italy, our estimates of 
θ are taken from a set of recent studies of the economic returns to education also sponsored by 
the European Commission (de la Fuente, Doménech and Jimeno (2003), de la Croix and 
Vandenberghe (2003) and Ciccone (2004)). The first two of these studies use data on gross 
wages and a specification that is identical to the one in HWW except in that a single equation is 
estimated for men and women jointly, including a sex dummy variable to allow for differences 
in wage levels. Using the same specification, Ciccone (2004) works with data on net wages but 
then adjusts his results to approximate gross returns using previous estimates of gross and net 
returns in Italy to construct a correction factor. 
For the remaining countries, we have constructed estimates of the gross (before-tax) return to 
schooling as follows. In the case of the Netherlands, we have found in the chapter for this 
country of the PURE volume (Smits et al, 2001) an estimate of male and female returns to 
schooling based on gross wages in 1996 that is obtained with a specification almost identical to 
the one used by HWW (p. 183, Table 10.3).16 Since similar estimates could not be found in the 
country chapters for Austria and Greece, we have adjusted HWW's results using the theoretical 
relationship between net and gross returns. The procedure is as follows. In the notation of 
section 2, the gross return to schooling is given by θ = f'(S)/f(S) and the net return by θn = 
Fe'(S)/Fe(S)  where Fe(S) = f(S) - T[f(S)]. Working with this last expression, it is easy to show that  
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where Te' and τe are the marginal and average income tax rates applicable to the average 
employed worker. We have used this formula to estimate the gross return to schooling given 
HWW's estimate of the net return. The data on marginal and average tax rates required for the 
calculation are taken from the OECD Tax Database and come originally from Taxing Wages 
(OECD, 2001). They refer to the year 2000 and are those applicable to a single person with no 
children and APW gross earnings. This calculation yields adjustment ratios of 0.873 for Greece 
and of 0.792 for Austria. 
All the estimates of θ  we have used are obtained by OLS (or WLS) and are therefore potentially 
subject to conflicting biases arising from measurement error and from the omission of ability in 
the regression. The consensus view in the literature seems to be that the net effect is likely to be 
a small upward bias. On the basis of a review of the results of twin studies, Card (1999) argues 
that the net bias in OLS estimates of the returns to schooling is likely to be around 10%. We 
have used this figure to correct the estimates discussed above. The values of θ  shown in Table 7 
                                                
16 The only difference is that, unlike HWW, Smits et al include a dummy for part-time workers in the 
female equation, but its estimated coefficient is zero. 
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below already incorporate this correction. They have been obtained by multiplying the original 
estimates by 0.9. 
  
 Employment and participation effects  
Following Heckmann (1979), we use a two-stage procedure to estimate the effect of schooling 
on labour force participation rates and employment probabilities. First we estimate a probit 
model that relates the probability that a given individual will be active (q) to his or her level of 
education, measured by years of schooling, and to a series of personal characteristics and other 
variables that are listed in Table 6. Then, we estimate a second probit relating the probability of 
employment (p) to schooling and to a subset of the same explanatory variables, including as an 
additional regressor a variable that measures the propensity of the individual to participate in 
the labour market.17 This variable, known as the inverse Mill's ratio, is constructed using the 
results of the first-stage regression. Its inclusion in the second equation serves to correct the 
likely sample selection bias that would arise in its absence. 
 
Table 6: Non-schooling variables used in the participation and employment equations 
____________________________________________ 
  participation employment 
 sex (male) X X 
 potential experience X X 
 potential experience squared X X 
 married (*) X  
 married*male X  
 children below twelve X  
 children below twelve* male X  
____________________________________________ 
(*) In addition to those that declare this status, we count as married those persons that are living in a 
"consensual union" with another person (question PD007). 
 
 The data are taken from the 1996 wave of the European Community Household Panel survey 
(ECHP), except in the case of Sweden where the data correspond to 1997. The years of schooling 
variable used in the participation and employment probits is constructed by combining 
information from two different questions in the ECHP survey with the theoretical durations of 
the different school cycles reported in de la Fuente and Doménech (2002, Table 4). The first 
question classifies respondents into three educational levels (low, medium and high, with high 
corresponding to tertiary studies and medium to upper secondary). The second question gives 
the age at which the individual left the highest schooling cycle he completed. This last question 
can in principle be used to construct a direct estimate of years of schooling, but the percentage 
of responses is low in four countries. An additional problem is that an estimate of years of 
schooling based on this question will be biased upward if the agent had to repeat a course or 
temporarily interrupted his studies at some point. Hence, we base our attainment estimates on 
                                                
17 In order to avoid identification problems, the explanatory variables used in the second equation should 
be a subset of the set of regressors of the first-stage equation (see Wooldridge, 2002). In our case, we 
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the response to the first question. On the other hand, we use the second question to try to refine 
the initial breakdown into three educational levels by distinguishing between primary and 
lower secondary education on the one hand, and between the first and second cycles of 
university on the other. For instance, a person who classifies himself as having a low education 
will be assumed to have completed lower secondary schooling except if the number of years of 
schooling implied by the answer to the second question is lower than the theoretical cumulative 
duration of this cycle, in which case we assume the individual has only completed primary 
schooling. 
The detailed results of the estimation are in Tables A.12 and A.13 in section 5 of Appendix 1. 
The probabilities of employment (p) and of labour force participation (q) of adult workers are 
estimated as the prediction of the relevant equation for the average values of the regressors. 
Our preliminary estimates of p' and q' are the estimated marginal effects of schooling calculated 
at the sample means of all the regressors. Since these estimates potentially suffer from the same 
biases as the Mincerian coefficients discussed above, our final estimates of p' and q' are 
obtained by multiplying the preliminary estimates by 0.9 and 0.8 respectively. This correction is 
entirely ad-hoc since we lack an outside estimate of the size of the relevant net bias, but it seems 
plausible that the bias on p' will be of the same order of magnitude as that in wage equations, 
and that the bias on q' should be larger as agents who know early on that it is unlikely that they 
will be seeking a job in the future for reasons that we cannot control for will choose to leave 
school early. 
We have been unable to use the ECHP data to estimate the employment and participation 
probabilities of students.18 To get around this problem, we have used aggregate data from the 
2003 edition of Education at a Glance to calculate rough correction factors for the employment 
and participation probabilities of students (ηp and ηq). This source reports the employment and 
participation rates of the 20 to 24 age group in 2001, distinguishing between those enrolled in 
educational institutions and those who have already completed their formal schooling. A 
preliminary estimate of the correction factors is obtained by dividing the first of these figures by 
the second one. To obtain the values of ηp and ηq shown in Table 7 below, we  assign a value of 
1 to countries where the preliminary estimate exceeds that value (that is, we assume that, other 
things equal, it is never easier to find part-time employment as a student than a full-time job). 
See section 2 of Appendix 1 for further details. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
assume that marital status and the number of children under twelve years of age affect the participation 
decision but not the probability of employment conditional on participation. 
18 The survey includes two questions that may in principle be used to identify students, but neither of 
them suits our purposes. The first one asks whether the individual is or has been enrolled in formal 
schooling during the current or preceding year, and the second one asks the person to identify his or her 
main activity, giving "student" as an option. The problem with the first question is that, because it mixes 
currently enrolled students with those who have recently completed their training, its use as a control 
variable will underestimate the effects of school enrollment on the variables of interest. For the second 
question, the problem is the opposite one, as it is likely that many employed students will fail to report 
education as their main occupation. In some countries, for instance, the intersection between self-reported 
students and the labour force or the employed population is empty. 
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 Tax rates and unemployment and retirement benefits 
Tax and benefit parameters are taken from various OECD sources and refer to single 
individuals with no children. All the personal tax rates used to calculate private returns 
incorporate (local, regional and national) income taxes and, when appropriate, employee (but 
not employer) social security contributions so as to be consistent with the definition of gross 
wages that seems to have been used in the wage equation estimates we are using. For the 
calculation of fiscal returns, employer social insurance contributions and consumption taxes are 
taken into account as well. 
The average and marginal tax rates on adult employed workers (τe and Te') and employer social 
security contribution rates for full-time workers (ee and Ee') are taken directly from the OECD's 
on-line Tax Database (and originally from Taxing Wages) and refer to the year 2000. The tax 
rates on employed adult workers are those applicable to an individual earning the same salary 
as the average production worker (APW), i.e. with average earnings for full-time workers in the 
manufacturing sector. Employer social contribution rates on part-time student earnings (es) 
have been approximated, for lack of better information, by those applicable to workers earning 
67% of APW wages. For most countries this is actually correct, as contributions are levied at a 
flat rate on gross wages, but in a handful of them this is not the case.  
The average tax rate on student income (τs) and the average and marginal tax rates on 
pensioners (τp and Tp’) have been constructed using the description of the 2000 tax systems of 
European countries given in Taxing Wages 2000-2001 (OECD, 2001). In the case of students, we 
have assumed a gross income level equal to 20% of before-tax APW earnings. For pensioners, 
we use the tax rates corresponding to estimated gross pension income at the midpoint of the 
retirement period. We have relied on the notes given in the country chapters of OECD (2005) 
and in chapter S.1 of OECD (2001) on the tax treatment of pension income to complement our 
basic source on EU tax systems. 
The consumption tax rate (τc) is taken from Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000). These authors 
construct τc as the ratio between consumption tax revenue (including excise and general 
consumption taxes) and total final consumption measured in gross terms (i.e. including indirect 
taxes) using data for the period 1991-97 taken from the OECD's National Acccounts and Revenue 
Statistics. 
Unemployment benefit parameters (B', b and β) and the average and marginal tax rates on 
unemployed workers (τu and Tu') have been calculated using the information contained in the 
country chapters of the OECD's Benefit Systems and Work Incentives 1999 (OECD, 2000) assuming 
again that we are dealing with a single individual with no children whose wage prior to the loss 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
of employment was equal to APW earnings.19 We have used this source rather than OECD 
(2001) because it contains a more detailed description of the tax treatment of unemployment 
benefits. For this calculation, we have assumed that any unemployment spells experienced by 
the representative worker are sufficiently brief that he does not exhaust the contributive 
benefits to which he is entitled. Replacement rates have been constructed taking into account 
benefit ceilings (the marginal rate, B', is set to zero when the ceiling is binding for our reference 
individual) and incorporate housing benefits for the unemployed but treating them as lump-
sum payments. While this is incorrect in many cases, the description of these benefits provided 
by OECD (2000) is too sketchy to allow a more careful treatment, and the resulting error is 
unlikely to be important because housing benefits are generally a small fraction of income out 
of employment. The one exception to this is the UK, but the amount of the benefit appears to be 
fixed in this case. (See section 2 of Appendix 1 for additional details on tax and benefit 
parameters). 
Data on retirement benefits under mandatory pension schemes have been taken from OECD 
(2005). This source provides estimates of starting pensions for workers with a “full carrer” of 
contributions (between age 20 and the statutory retirement age) at different levels of average 
income as well as information on pension indexation practices. Marginal benefit ratios (PB’) 
linking starting pensions with pre-retirement income have been estimated by comparing the 
initial pensions of workers with average income levels of 100% and 150% of APW wages. Initial 
pensions expressed as a fraction of APW gross wages have then been projected to the midpoint 
of the worker’s expected post-retirement life using the indexation rates taken from OECD (2005) 
and our assumption on the growth of average earnings. We use the relative income of 
pensioners at this point in life to calculate the relevant tax rates. For additional details see 
section 2 of the Appendix. 
 
 Academic failure rates, school durations and length of working lives 
As noted above, we distinguish between school attainment measured by the number of 
successfully completed grades, S, and the number of years spent in formal schooling, X. These 
two quantities can differ because students may take several years to complete a single grade or 
may drop out of the system without passing a grade. To construct the function S(X) that relates 
these two variables, we would need comparable data on repetition and drop out rates for the 
countries in the sample. Since we have not been able to find such information, we have 
constructed a rough approximation to S(X) using OECD data on survival rates in tertiary 
studies and on other indicators that can be used to approximate the school survival rate at the 
upper secondary level.    
In particular, we approximate the marginal contribution of time in school to academic progress, 
S'(Xo), by an estimate of the yearly probability of survival in school (σ). This probability is 
                                                
19 While the tax parameters for employed workers and students correspond to 2000, the tax and benefit 
parameters for unemployed workers will reflect the regulations in force one year earlier. This is unlikely to 
be an important problem, as legislative changes between the two years appear to be infrequent and minor. 
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estimated separately for upper secondary (σusec) and tertiary studies (σuniv) using the 
procedure discussed in section 4 of Appendix 1. The results are then averaged across levels in 
the usual way, so that the single value of S'(Xo) that is used in the rate of return calculations is 
given by S'(Xo) = (2*σusec+σuniv)/3.  
The estimates of σ are also used to correct upward the theoretical duration of these two school 
cycles so as to approximate the actual time spent in school by the average individual in each 
country. The corrected duration of each cycle will be given by Di = di/σi, where di is its 
theoretical duration in years and 1/σi the average time required to complete each grade. The 
time spent in school by an individual of average attainment, Xo, is then computed in the usual 
manner but using the corrected rather than the theoretical durations of the upper secondary 
and tertiary school cycles (ignoring therefore any potential delays carried over from 
compulsory schooling). The calculation makes use of the breakdown of the adult population by 
attainment level given in de la Fuente and Doménech (2001) and refers to 1990. 
The expected length of the working life of the representative individual (Ho) is calculated as the 
difference between the average retirement age and the age at which average attainment has 
been completed (provided this last figure is at least fourteen years). Retirement ages refer to 
1995 and are calculated by averaging the estimates for males and females reported by Blöndal 
and Scarpetta (1999), weighting them by the share of each sex in total employment (using 
Eurostat data for 2000 referring to the age group 25-64). Average life expectancy (Z) is 
calculated in a similar way using separate estimates for males and females taken from 
Economic Policy Committee (2001) and ultimately from Eurostat. 
Table 7 shows the actual data used in the rate of return calculations. Blank entries indicate that 
either the variable is not defined for a given country or is irrelevant for the calculations. For 
instance, β  is defined only for Germany and Austria because these are the only two countries 
that link unemployment benefits to after-tax income in employment, and the marginal tax rate 
on unemployed workers, Tu', is not given for those countries where unemployment 
compensation is paid at a fixed rate or benefit ceilings are binding for the average worker (so 
that B' = 0 in any event) because the term that enters the rate of return calculations involves the 
product of these two variables. 
Bold type is used in Table 7 to identify unreliable data. Bold entries in the table indicate that an 
observation is suspicious or that the data required for its calculation are unavailable and have 
been "estimated" by imputing to problem countries the values observed in close neighbours or 
in countries with similar income levels. Plain bold characters are used when data problems can 
be expected to have an important effect on the rate of return calculations, and bold italics are 
used otherwise. Missing information about educational expenditure or its financing has been a 
problem in four countries (Austria, Greece, Italy and Portugal) but this should not have a 
material impact on the estimated rates of return, except possibly in the case of Portugal where 
expenditure may appear to be artificially high when measured as a fraction of APW earnings 
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due to the suspect and atypically low value of this variable relative to GDP per capita (see 
section 1c of Appendix 1). Our estimates of S'(Xo) in Greece and the UK are also based on 
incomplete data, as no information on survival rates is available for the UK at the university 
level and for Greece in the upper secondary cycle. 
Table 7: Data used in the calculation of the private and fiscal returns to schooling 
 
µ µs  µg µg' Wo θ  p' p ps 
Austria 35.33% -1.40% 36.73% 37.70% 21,364 7.74% 0.34% 95.66% 93.47% 
Belgium  21.46% 0.32% 21.14% 22.99% 26,721 6.30% 1.50% 92.82% 92.82% 
Denmark 21.38% -4.44% 25.82% 26.21% 34,975 5.14% 0.48% 94.86% 92.80% 
Finland 22.91% -1.84% 24.74% 25.13% 29,587 7.83% 1.56% 88.16% 86.62% 
France 32.76% 1.94% 30.82% 33.42% 19,171 6.99% 1.58% 92.67% 92.67% 
Germany 21.29% 0.00% 18.26% 22.49% 29,423 7.85% 0.60% 94.13% 94.13% 
Greece 21.56% 0.98% 20.58% 21.92% 9,734 7.39% 1.20% 88.59% 78.58% 
Ireland 27.20% 0.73% 26.48% 30.07% 20,392 9.81% 2.14% 91.74% 90.04% 
Italy 25.28% 0.74% 24.54% 26.15% 18,951 6.19% 1.88% 85.81% 73.02% 
Netherlands 21.40% -1.34% 22.74% 23.68% 26,062 6.03% 0.53% 96.14% 95.05% 
Portugal 39.51% -0.33% 39.84% 40.14% 7,041 8.73% 0.38% 95.79% 95.79% 
Spain 25.64% 4.05% 21.59% 26.12% 13,816 7.54% 2.21% 80.05% 72.15% 
Sweden 29.84% -5.80% 35.64% 37.61% 25,118 3.56% 1.40% 89.89% 84.79% 
UK 20.34% 0.94% 19.40% 22.31% 27,864 9.30% 0.70% 94.62% 94.62% 
          avge. EU14 26.14% -0.39% 26.31% 28.28% 22,159 7.17% 1.18% 91.50% 88.33% 
 
 q' q η ηq τs τe Te'  τu T'u 
Austria 1.13% 75.43% 0.977 0.222 18.20% 0.279 0.429   
Belgium  2.21% 79.89% 1.000 0.183 13.07% 0.419 0.555 0.00%  
Denmark 0.86% 86.82% 0.978 0.757 20.04% 0.441 0.507 33.84%  
Finland 1.28% 84.13% 0.983 0.566 23.20% 0.336 0.480 20.89% 34.63% 
France 2.18% 79.25% 1.000 0.257 18.01% 0.268 0.335 11.15% 40.56% 
Germany 1.29% 82.42% 1.000 0.628 20.50% 0.420 0.579   
Greece 1.16% 69.50% 0.887 0.122 15.90% 0.181 0.285 4.22% 15.90% 
Ireland 2.94% 73.79% 0.982 0.228 0.00% 0.203 0.525 0.00%  
Italy 1.77% 71.87% 0.851 0.167 9.19% 0.285 0.404 0.67% 19.00% 
Netherlands 1.53% 81.18% 0.989 0.695 10.52% 0.362 0.531 27.55% 37.05% 
Portugal 1.12% 74.84% 1.000 0.218 11.00% 0.177 0.260 0.00% 0.00% 
Spain 2.05% 69.26% 0.901 0.250 6.35% 0.185 0.288 10.68%  
Sweden 0.77% 91.37% 0.943 0.358 24.21% 0.329 0.352 31.97%  
UK 0.54% 82.81% 1.000 0.636 0.00% 0.236 0.320 0.00%  
          avge. EU14 1.49% 78.75% 0.964 0.378 13.73% 0.294 0.418   
______________________________________________________________________ 
   Notes: 
- The values of θ, p' and q' shown in the table are the original OLS estimates multiplied by an adjustment 
coefficient (0.9 in the first two cases and 0.8 in the third one) that attempts to correct for the likely net 
endogeneity bias. 
 - Entries in bold type indicate unreliable estimates. For the sake of completeness, we generally estimate 
missing data by assuming that a country is similar to its neighbours.  
- When the value of η  given in Table A.6 of Appendix 1 exceeds 1, we use a value of 1. 
- We estimate educational expenditure by enterprises in Germany to be 3.03% of APW wages. 
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Table 7: Data used in the calculations -- continued 
 
τp T'p ee E'e es τc pb PB’ ω 
Austria 16.72% 33.73% 23.50% 23.50% 23.50% 20.0% 59.35% 78.30% 0 
Belgium  15.84% 28.63% 32.70% 34.70% 31.70% 18.7% 30.91% 23.30% 0 
Denmark 28.03% 39.80% 0.50% 0.00% 0.70% 25.7% 32.10% 4.30% 0 
Finland 25.93% 37.87% 26.00% 26.00% 26.00% 22.7% 53.55% 71.50% 0.20% 
France 9.91% 23.44% 41.20% 41.20% 29.10% 18.0% 39.54% 46.30% 0 
Germany 3.80% 3.80% 20.50% 20.50% 20.50% 15.8% 34.63% 45.80% 1% 
Greece 1.37% 5.00% 28.00% 28.00% 28.00% 18.6% 60.51% 84.00% 0 
Ireland 0.00% 0.00% 12.00% 12.00% 8.50% 22.8% 22.19% 0.00% 1% 
Italy 16.94% 25.50% 34.10% 34.10% 34.10% 16.0% 57.67% 78.80% 0 
Netherlands 13.88% 20.05% 16.20% 12.30% 15.90% 18.7% 51.72% 68.30% 1% 
Portugal 2.11% 14.00% 23.75% 23.75% 23.75% 20.5% 47.79% 64.30% 0 
Spain 9.75% 28.62% 30.60% 30.60% 30.60% 13.7% 58.91% 81.20% 0 
Sweden 27.45% 30.38% 32.90% 32.90% 32.90% 18.7% 47.24% 64.20% 0 
UK 0.92% 10.00% 9.30% 12.20% 7.80% 16.9% 27.25% 13.70% 0 
          avge. EU14 12.33% 21.49% 23.66% 23.70% 22.36% 19.06% 44.53% 51.71% 0.23% 
 
 
β B' b S' Xo U H Z 
Austria 60%   91.14% 11.52 57.68 40.17 77.71 
Belgium   0.0% 37.47% 91.59% 10.24 56.12 39.89 77.87 
Denmark  0.0% 52.89% 96.70% 11.81 61.17 43.36 77.24 
Finland  58.9% 54.41% 96.07% 11.05 58.95 41.90 77.32 
France  57.4% 57.40% 93.23% 10.61 58.79 42.18 78.40 
Germany 60%   95.77% 13.06 59.59 40.53 77.35 
Greece  40.0% 40.00% 94.18% 7.98 61.55 47.55 77.82 
Ireland  0.0% 23.59% 93.47% 9.51 62.07 46.56 76.18 
Italy  30.0% 30.00% 93.57% 8.11 59.36 45.25 77.87 
Netherlands  70.0% 73.05% 96.26% 11.02 57.33 40.31 77.76 
Portugal  65.0% 65.00% 87.10% 6.50 62.32 48.32 75.29 
Spain  0.0% 68.19% 92.89% 7.17 60.50 46.50 77.50 
Sweden  0.0% 68.35% 87.83% 10.92 62.72 45.80 79.56 
UK  0.0% 35.03% 93.28% 10.66 61.36 44.70 77.34 
         average EU14    93.08% 10.01 59.97 43.79 77.52 
______________________________________________________________________ 
-   Note: blank entries indicate that a parameter is not defined or not relevant for the calculations. 
 
 6. Results for the EU: i) Private returns and effective tax rates 
Figure 1 displays our estimates of the rate of return to schooling in the member countries of the 
EU before and after taking into account the effects of public policies (i.e. what we have called 
the raw and all-in rates of return).20 For most countries, the all-in rate of return, robs, lies 
                                                
20 In this figure, and elsewhere in the paper unless otherwise noted, the rates of return for the average EU 
country are obtained by entering the average values of the relevant parameters into the rate of return 
formula, and not by averaging the rates of return across countries. We use, in particular, the average 
values of T', Δ and τ, which are computed in a slightly different manner in Austria and Germany but enter 
the final formula in the same way. 
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between 7.5% and 10%, with a value of 8.96% for a hypothetical average EU country. Sweden is 
a clear outlier. The rate of return estimated for this country (4.72%) is almost three points lower 
than that of the Netherlands, which is the second country at the bottom of the distribution. By 
contrast, the estimated value of robs exceeds 10% in the UK, Ireland, Portugal and Finland. Raw 
returns vary between 3.21% in Sweden and 10.98% in Ireland.  
 
Figure 1: Private rate of return to schooling in the EU 
3%
5%
7%
9%
11%
13%
UK Ir Po Fi Ge Gr avge Ost Fr It Dk Sp Be Nl Sw
raw all-in
 
- Legend: UK = United Kingdom; Ir = Ireland; Po = Portugal; Fi = Finland; Gr = Greece; Ge = Germany; avge. 
= average; It = Italy; Ost = Austria; Dk = Denmark; Sp = Spain; Be = Belgium; Nl = Netherlands; Sw = 
Sweden. 
 
Both the raw and the all-in returns to schooling are primarily determined by the wage-related 
benefits of education and by its opportunity cost, with employment-related effects and direct 
costs playing a secondary but far from negligible role. As shown in Figure 2, almost 20% of the 
raw benefits of schooling in the average EU country come from its impact on employment rates, 
and over one third of its costs are direct resource costs. When we consider government 
intervention, however, the picture changes significantly: the share of employment effects on the 
total benefits of schooling drops by almost one half, indicating that this component of returns is 
taxed more heavily than the wage component, and direct (private) costs become negative as a 
result of government subsidies in excess of household expenditure on schooling.21 Pension 
benefits come into the picture once we introduce government, but their weight in the the total 
after-tax benefits of schooling is only of 2.3% in the average EU country. 
 
 
 
                                                
21 This may be somewhat misleading as our cost estimates do not take into account the purchase of books 
and other classroom materials or other school-related expenses such as transport. 
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Figure 2: Relative weight of different cost and benefit components of the return to schooling 
in the average EU country 
 
There is considerable variation across countries in these respects, however. Subsidies are 
particularly generous in the Scandinavian countries, while net private costs are highest in 
Spain, mainly as a result of the existence of a large private sector at the secondary level which is 
only partially subsidized by the state. Employment effects account for over 30% of the raw 
benefits of schooling in Spain, Italy and Sweden and for less than 5% in Germany, Portugal, 
Austria and the UK. Pensions account for less than 6% of the after-tax benefits of schooling in 
all countries. (See tables A.14 and A.15 in section 5 of Appendix 1 for the values of the different 
benefit and cost components of the raw and all-in rates of return).
 
Figures 3a and 3b plot our estimates of raw and all-in returns against the Mincerian returns 
parameter (θ) that is often interpreted as a direct estimate of the returns to schooling. As may be 
suggested by the preceding discussion, the correlation between θ and both rnogov't and robs is 
high (0.87 and 0.91, respectively), but for many countries there are significant differences 
between θ and the different estimates of the rate of return that reflect, among other factors, the 
size of employment effects and the impact of taxes, subsidies and other public policies on all-in 
returns. In Denmark, for instance, the all-in return to schooling exceeds the value of θ  by 56%. 
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Figure 3: Rate of return to schooling vs. Mincerian returns parameter 
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b. All-in return 
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 The effect of public policies 
A comparison between the raw and all-in rates of return displayed in Figure 1 suggests that 
government policies have an often large and rather uneven impact on educational returns. As 
shown in Figure 4, the effective tax rate on human capital ranges between -57.7% in Denmark 
and 12.8% in Spain. 
 
Figure 4: Effective tax rate on human capital (
  
 
etrgov't ) 
 
 
The detailed results of the wedge and tax rate calculations are shown in Tables A.17 and A.18 in 
section 5 of the Appendix and are summarized in Figures 4 and 5. Table 8 shows the numerical 
values of the effective tax rates that underlie Figure 4 and a number of the variables that enter 
the approximate decomposition of this variable given in equation (42) in section 3.  
 
Figure 5: Components of the effective tax rate on human capital 
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b. Taxes (
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Table 8: Effective tax rate on schooling  and its main determinants 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
  
 
etrgov't  
  
 
!'
"' +!'
 
 
!  π s πe π−πe 
  
 
µg
µ
 
Spain 12.83% 0.313 0.787 0.264 0.303 0.126 0.137 0.842 
Ireland -0.54% 0.219 0.314 0.419 0.400 0.404 0.015 0.973 
Belgium  -6.59% 0.253 0.662 0.270 0.393 0.234 0.036 0.985 
Finland -10.62% 0.217 0.676 0.208 0.371 0.217 -0.009 1.080 
Greece -12.97% 0.187 0.498 0.127 0.286 0.127 0.000 0.955 
Germany -13.65% 0.091 0.614 0.274 0.371 0.274 0.000 1.000 
Italy -18.58% 0.317 0.454 0.168 0.368 0.166 0.001 0.971 
France -21.36% 0.237 0.713 0.104 0.376 0.092 0.013 0.941 
UK -23.39% 0.086 0.472 0.133 0.343 0.110 0.023 0.954 
Netherlands -24.16% 0.107 0.835 0.262 0.402 0.265 -0.003 1.063 
Austria -42.54% 0.054 0.611 0.208 0.439 0.208 0.000 1.040 
Sweden -47.01% 0.440 0.715 0.104 0.497 0.034 0.070 1.194 
Portugal -51.11% 0.052 0.797 0.097 0.458 0.101 -0.003 1.008 
Denmark -57.66% 0.120 0.638 0.147 0.495 0.118 0.029 1.208 
         mean -22.67% 0.192 0.628 0.199 0.393 0.177 0.022 1.015 
 
 
  
 
etrgov't  
  
 
!'
"' +!'
 
 
!  π s πe π−πe 
  
 
µg
µ
 
Spain 35.50% 162.7 125.4 132.5 77.1 71.4 622.8 82.9 
Ireland 22.13% 113.7 50.1 210.9 101.8 228.4 70.3 95.9 
Belgium  16.08% 131.4 105.4 136.0 100.0 132.3 165.3 97.0 
Finland 12.05% 112.8 107.8 104.5 94.4 122.6 -40.5 106.4 
Greece 9.70% 97.2 79.3 63.7 72.8 71.8 -1.3 94.0 
Germany 9.02% 47.3 97.9 137.8 94.4 155.0 0.0 98.5 
Italy 4.08% 164.8 72.4 84.3 93.7 94.1 5.3 95.6 
France 1.31% 123.1 113.5 52.3 95.7 51.7 56.8 92.7 
UK -0.72% 45.0 75.3 66.6 87.4 62.2 102.7 94.0 
Netherlands -1.49% 55.6 133.0 131.6 102.3 149.7 -14.3 104.7 
Austria -19.88% 28.3 97.3 104.6 111.8 117.6 0.0 102.4 
Sweden -24.34% 228.7 113.9 52.3 126.4 19.4 317.0 117.6 
Portugal -28.44% 27.3 127.0 49.0 116.5 57.0 -15.3 99.3 
Denmark -34.99% 62.2 101.7 73.9 125.8 66.7 131.4 119.0 
         mean 0.00% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
std. dev. 19.59% 57.4 22.7 44.4 15.4 52.6 171.9 9.3 
______________________________________________________________________ 
- Note: In the upper part of the table, mean is the unweighted average of each column.  
 
In addition to the tax rates on the wage and employment benefits of education (π  and ρ), the 
overall subsidy rate (s) and the share of employment effects (ε'/(ε'+θ')), the table shows the 
fraction of the total direct costs of schooling that is paid by the government (µg/µ), the 
component of the progressivity indicator that reflects the operation of the tax system per se, 
abstracting from unemployment benefits (πe), and the increase in progressivity induced by 
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after-tax unemployment benefits (π-πe). The lower panel of the table gives the normalized 
values of the different variables. The effective tax rate is measured in deviations from the 
sample average (notice that this is not the estimated tax rate for the hypothetical average EU 
country) and the rest of the variables are normalized by their respective sample means, which 
are set equal to 100. To help identify atypical behaviour, we show in bold type those entries that 
are more than a standard deviation away from the sample mean. 
Taken together, public policies imply a net subsidy to human capital at a rate of 18.6% in the 
average European country. (Notice in Figure 4 that the average value of 
  
 
etrgov't  is negative). 
Hence, educational subsidies and pension benefits more than offset the disincentive effects 
generated by personal taxes and unemployment benefits. The average subsidy rate (subs) stands 
at a very respectable 46% when we consider only the effects of public educational finance 
(Figure 5a) but both personal taxes and social benefits reduce the net return to schooling and 
partially offset direct subsidies to education. The effective tax rates induced by these factors in 
the average EU country are 8.2% and 21.9% respectively (Figures 5b and 5c). Somewhat 
surprisingly, unemployment protection seems to be a significantly more important source of 
distortions than taxes per se. Finally, the subsidy rate implied by pension benefits stands at 
2.4% in the average EU country. 
There are very important differences across countries in terms of both the total effective tax 
burden on human capital and the sources of this burden. Spain is the only country where the 
overall effective tax rate on schooling is positive. It is followed by Ireland and Belgium, where 
the net subsidy is below 10%. At the other end of the scale, the effective subsidy rate on 
schooling exceeds 40% in Austria, Sweden, Portugal and Denmark. 
Figure 5 and Table 8 help us understand the sources of differences in effective tax rates across 
countries. In the case of Ireland, the main disincentive has to do with the very high 
progressivity of personal taxes at APW income levels (πe). In Spain and Belgium, the main 
problem has to do with unemployment protection. In these countries employment effects 
account for a large share of the total returns to schooling and are subject to high taxes (i.e. to 
large replacement ratios). In addition, benefit ceilings are binding in both countries at APW 
income levels making the marginal tax rate on the wage benefits of schooling equal to 100% for 
the unemployed. This, in turn, raises average progressivity (π − πe is positive and large) and 
therefore the tax rate on the wage component of the returns to schooling.  
The four countries shown at the bottom of Table 8 are characterized by very large subsidy rates 
(although this result is somewhat suspect in the case of Portugal for reasons already discussed). 
In addition, the disincentive effects of personal taxes are low (except in Austria). In both 
Denmark and Sweden, the tax system actually raises the return to schooling. This surprising 
result arises from a combination of factors that includes low tax progressivity ratios at average 
income levels and the interaction between a negative private cost (µs < 0) and a high average tax 
rate on adult workers. In Portugal and Austria, finally, the tax rate implied by unemployment 
benefits is very low because the probability of employment is rather insensitive to school  
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attainment and the contribution of the tax-benefit schedule facing the unemployed to overall 
progressivity is either zero or negative. 
 
Table 9: Correlation between the effective tax rate or its components and various 
determinants 
______________________________________________________________ 
  
  
 
!'
"' +!'
 
 
!  π s πe π−πe 
  
 
µg
µ
 
 etr
gov ' t
 0.303 -0.237 0.617 -0.812 0.465 0.297 -0.744 
 subs  0.313 0.312 -0.399 0.779 -0.433 0.131 0.638 
 etr
tax
 -0.339 -0.290 0.594 -0.452 0.710 -0.359 -0.576 
 etr
ben
 0.844 0.326 -0.195 0.282 -0.455 0.664 0.325 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
  
To help isolate the key factors underlying the effective tax rate on schooling and its 
components, Table 9 shows the correlation between each of these indicators and the variables 
given in Table 8. These correlations suggest that the unemployment benefits component of the 
tax rate (etrben) is dominated by two factors: the weight of employment effects on the total 
benefits of schooling (ε'/(ε'+θ')), and the contribution of social benefits to overall progressivity 
(π−πe). The tax component (etrtax) is mainly determined by the degree of pure tax progressivity 
(πe) and the subsidy rate (subs) reflects government's contribution to the direct costs of 
schooling. The overall subsidy rate and the overall degree of progressivity are the main 
determinants of the total effective tax rate, etrgov't. 
 
 How does the private return on schooling compare with that on alternative assets? 
Table 10 compares the private after-tax return to education (under the all-in scenario, OBS) to 
the before-tax real return on debt and equity for those countries for which we could find 
homogeneous data.  The real returns on bonds and stocks are averages for the period 1950-1989 
and are taken from Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2002).22 Column [5] of this table shows what 
we will call the (private) premium on human capital. This variable is defined as the difference 
between the all-in rate of return on schooling (column [1] of the same table) and the average 
return on a portfolio where bonds and shares have the same weight (column [4]). 
 
 
 
                                                
22 The same source provides average returns for the period 1950-2000. This last year, however, is probably 
not a good reference point, for it marks the peak of a long bull market associated with a "technological 
bubble." At the time the first version of this paper was written, many Western stock market indices had 
lost around 50% of their value relative to their 2000 peaks. The average return on the equal weights 
portfolio we use as a reference was one percentage point higher over 1950-2000 than over 1950-89 (5.02% 
rather than 4.03%). This is a significant difference, but it does not qualitatively change our conclusions. 
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Table 10: After-tax rate of return on schooling vs. before-tax real return  
on financial assets, and premium on human capital 
__________________________________________________________ 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
  schooling 
robs 
equity bonds avge. 
portfolio 
premium on 
h. capital 
 Belgium  7.67% 6.50% 1.90% 4.20% 3.47% 
 Denmark 8.01% 6.20% 2.60% 4.40% 3.61% 
 France 8.80% 7.70% 3.70% 5.70% 3.10% 
 Germany 9.46% 9.50% 3.40% 6.45% 3.01% 
 Ireland 11.03% 6.90% 0.30% 3.60% 7.43% 
 Italy 8.66% 4.90% 0.20% 2.55% 6.11% 
 Netherlands 7.59% 7.50% -0.30% 3.60% 3.99% 
 Spain 7.77% 4.50% -0.90% 1.80% 5.97% 
 Sweden 4.72% 8.70% -0.80% 3.95% 0.77% 
 UK 12.27% 8.30% -0.30% 4.00% 8.27% 
        mean value 8.60% 7.07% 0.98% 4.03% 4.57% 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
These data suggest that schooling is a rather attractive investment from an individual point of 
view.23 For the average country in this reduced sample, the real return to schooling exceeds the 
return on bonds by 7.62 points and that on equity by 1.53 points. When allowance is made for 
taxes on capital income (a complicated matter we will not address here), the premium on 
schooling will increase significantly. The return differential with bonds is positive in all 
countries and is always above 5 points. The before-tax return to equity, however, is marginally 
above the rate of return on schooling in Germany, and significantly so in Sweden due to a 
combination of outstanding stock market performance and the lowest returns to education in 
the sample. The premium on human capital, as defined above, is positive in all countries, and 
ranges from 0.77% in Sweden to 8.27% in the UK with a mean value of 4.57%. 
 
 
                                                
23 In order to draw unequivocal conclusions about the relative attractiveness of education as an 
investment, we would need to control for the riskiness of its returns. While the variation of earnings across 
workers with similar attainment levels is very high, much of this variation is not the result of random luck 
but of differences in individual abilities and career choices. We are not aware of any refined measures of 
earnings risk that can be used to make valid comparisons with other assets.  
For an attempt in this line, see Palacios-Huerta (2003). This author, however, considers only the time-series 
component of wage risk for highly aggregated sex-race-experience groups. With these data, Sharpe ratios 
(which measure the expected return per unit of risk) clearly favour educational investment over shares in 
the US. Surprisingly, however, formal tests for mean-variance spanning suggest that the risk-adjusted 
returns of schooling dominate those of equities only for university education, but not for secondary 
schooling. Christiansen et al (2004) construct what are probably better measures of wage risk using the 
average residuals in Mincer equations for specific types of education. They find that the risk-return trade-
off involved varies a lot with the type of studies but do not compare their results with the returns on 
financial assets.  
On a somewhat different note, Padula and Pistaferri (2001) provide some evidence that introducing risk 
considerations may actually increase the attractiveness of investment in schooling. They find, in particular, 
that increases in attainment tend to lower wage risk and, as a result, increase the (risk-adjusted) rate of 
return on schooling. (Thanks to G. Brunello for providing this reference). 
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 7. Results for the EU: ii) Fiscal returns 
In this section we will use the equations derived in section 4 to explore the fiscal consequences 
of increasing average attainment by one year in each EU country. We will assume that the 
increase in the direct costs of schooling, including non-tuition grants at the existing level, is 
born entirely by the government (that is, we will use µg' as our measure of government 
expenditure in equations (56) and (57)). Aside from this, our raw data are the same that have 
already been used to calculate the private returns to schooling in the previous section. We will, 
however, introduce a number of deviations from our previous assumptions to try to obtain a 
more realistic estimate of the impact of schooling on public finances. First, we will now take 
into account the effects of schooling on labour force participation rates. Hence, our calculations 
in this section will apply to a representative individual who may or may not be active with 
probabilities based on observed labour force participation rates, rather than to an individual 
who remains active throughout his student and adult life, as was the case in the previous 
section.  
Second, we will try to approximate the general equilibrium effects of schooling on wages and 
employment probabilities. As has already been noted, the estimates of the wage (θ) and 
employment (p' and q') benefits of schooling reported in Table 7 are partial equilibrium 
estimates that capture expected return to a single individual of staying one more year in school 
holding constant the aggregate attainment level and factor prices. It should be expected, 
however, that the realized marginal returns to schooling will be smaller when the government 
undertakes policies that raise average attainment at the aggregate level. As discussed in de la 
Fuente (2003)24 the required correction to the wage benefits of schooling can be approximated 
by multiplying the estimated value of θ by one minus the share of capital in national income, 
which is around 1/3 in industrial countries. This adjustment, which holds the aggregate stock 
of capital constant and implicitly assumes that there is no capital mobility, can be regarded as 
rather conservative, especially for small countries. For the case of the employment and 
participation parameters we will introduce an ad-hoc correction that consists in reducing the 
original estimates of p' by two thirds and that of q' by one half. The correction factor for q' is 
smaller because the decision to join the labour force does not involve an element of competition 
with other workers for available jobs. 
Our estimates of the fiscal rate of return to schooling are shown in Table A.19 in section 6 of 
Appendix 1, where we also discuss some technical problems that arise in connection with the 
calculation of this rate of return when pensions are taken into account. Table 11 shows our 
estimates of the net present fiscal value per student (NPFV) of an additional year of schooling. 
For this calculation we assume a real discount rate of 3%, which is more than twice as large as 
the observed real return on government bonds in the sample (see Table 10) over the last few 
decades. Both sets of calculations are carried out under five alternative sets of assumptions: in 
                                                
24 See in particular section 8 of the Appendix. 
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scenario [1] we consider only personal taxes (including employee social security contributions) 
and unemployment benefits, in [2] we add consumption taxes, in [3] employer social security 
contributions and in [4] retirement benefits.  
 
 
Table 11: Net present fiscal value of an additional year of schooling 
__________________________________________________________ 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] DCOST 
 personal 
taxes 
+ consump. 
taxes 
+ employer 
s. sec. contr. 
+ pensions 
= OBS 
exp. per 
student 
Austria -4,197 -3,822 -2,393 -4,817 8,055 
Belgium  78 369 3,293 2,049 6,143 
Denmark -6,694 -6,268 -6,319 -6,590 9,166 
Finland 1,861 3,124 7,261 4,133 7,434 
France -2,348 -1,651 1,919 280 6,407 
Germany 2,579 3,252 6,123 2,735 6,619 
Greece -670 -327 727 -467 2,134 
Ireland 4,767 6,483 8,890 8,560 6,132 
Italy -1,635 -1,247 917 -923 4,956 
Netherlands -1,533 -1,089 -490 -3,563 6,170 
Portugal -1,760 -1,380 -588 -1,163 2,827 
Spain -20 361 2,558 954 3,609 
Sweden -8,995 -9,728 -11,198 -11,809 9,446 
UK 400 1,973 4,373 3,509 6,215 
      avge. EU14 -1,181 -541 1,611 -198 6,267 
___________________________________________________________ 
- Notes: The real discount rate used to calculate the NPV is 3%. All figures are in US dollars of 2000 at (that 
year's) current exchange rates. The last column gives total expenditure per student in the same units, 
inclusive of non-tuition transfers to households (calculated as µg'Wo). 
 
The NPFV estimates given in Table 11 can be interpreted as the negative of the net real cost of 
keeping the average student in school for an extra year, that is as (minus one times) the 
difference between the direct resource costs of schooling (DCOST, which are shown in the last 
column of Table 11) and the present value of the net tax revenues this expenditure generates.  
Our estimates imply that the net cost of an extra year of schooling is roughly 200 dollars in the 
average EU country. Since this figure is only a small fraction of the actual resource costs of 
education (which exceed $6,200), we must conclude that the net tax revenues generated by an 
increase in attainment allow the government to recoup the bulk of its educational outlays. To 
make the same point in a way that is perhaps clearer, Table 12 gives for each country and 
scenario the recovery rate on educational expenditure, defined as the percentage of the direct 
cost of education (including transfers to households) that is recovered through increases in 
taxes and savings on social insurance payments. Figure 6 shows that recovery rates seem to be 
driven mostly by the net wage returns to schooling as measured by θ' = θS'(Xo) - ν. Deviations 
from the fitted regression line reflect differences across countries in expenditure per student 
and in tax rates. 
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Table 12: Recovery rates on educational expenditure 
_________________________________________________ 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
 personal 
taxes 
+ consump. 
taxes 
+ employer 
s. sec. contr. 
+ pensions 
= OBS 
Austria 47.9% 52.6% 70.3% 40.2% 
Belgium  101.3% 106.0% 153.6% 133.4% 
Denmark 27.0% 31.6% 31.1% 28.1% 
Finland 125.0% 142.0% 197.7% 155.6% 
France 63.3% 74.2% 130.0% 104.4% 
Germany 139.0% 149.1% 192.5% 141.3% 
Greece 68.6% 84.7% 134.0% 78.1% 
Ireland 177.7% 205.7% 245.0% 239.6% 
Italy 67.0% 74.8% 118.5% 81.4% 
Netherlands 75.2% 82.4% 92.1% 42.3% 
Portugal 37.7% 51.2% 79.2% 58.9% 
Spain 99.4% 110.0% 170.9% 126.4% 
Sweden 4.8% -3.0% -18.6% -25.0% 
UK 106.4% 131.7% 170.4% 156.5% 
     avge. EU14 81.2% 91.4% 125.7% 96.8% 
____________________________________________________________ 
- Note: A real discount rate of 3% is used in the calculations. The fraction of direct expenditure recovered is 
calculated as (NPFV+DCOST)/DCOST. 
 
Figure 6: Recovery rate vs. θ ' 
 
 - Note: recovery rates correspond to column [4] in Table 12. 
 
Looking at Tables 11 and 12, we can divide the countries in our sample into three groups. In the 
first one, comprised only by Sweden, the recovery rate is negative, indicating that the net cost of 
schooling exceeds its direct costs because the present value of induced current and future net 
tax revenues is negative, even without taking into account pension liabilities. This is possible, 
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even though increased attainment does indeed raise incomes and therefore tax revenues in the 
future, because it does not do so by enough to compensate for the loss of the taxes that young 
people would pay in the current year, were they to join the labour market immediately. In the 
second group, the present value of induced tax and benefit flows is positive, but smaller than 
the direct costs of education, yielding recovery rates between zero and one. Austria, Denmark, 
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal fall in this group. Finally, in the third group, 
induced tax flows more than compensate for the direct costs of schooling, making the net 
present fiscal value of a year of schooling positive. This is the case in Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Spain and the UK.  
These results suggest that any increase in public educational expenditure required to 
marginally raise current attainment levels would largely pay for itself over the long run 
through higher tax revenues and lower social insurance payments in the average EU country. 
Recovery rates on educational expenditure exceed 50% in all EU countries but four (Sweden, 
Denmark, Austria and the Netherlands), and lie above 100% in seven of them. The net fiscal 
surplus per student is considerable in some of these states and can potentially make a modest 
positive contribution to public budgets in the future.  
 
 8. Conclusion 
In this paper we have constructed estimates of the private and fiscal returns to schooling in 14 
European countries and analyzed the impact of various public policies on the first of these 
variables. The estimated private returns to a one-year increase in schooling, starting from 
currently observed average attainment levels, cluster between 7.5% and 10% in most member 
states of the EU. Sweden is a clear outlier at the bottom of the distribution, possibly as a result 
of severe wage compression, while the highest returns correspond to the UK and Ireland, 
followed by Portugal and Finland. In practically all European countries, the returns to schooling 
compare quite favorably with those available from standard financial assets. Taking as a 
reference a balanced portfolio of corporate shares and government bonds, the premium on 
education ranges from 0.8% in Sweden to 8.3% in the UK with a mean value of 4.9%.  
Various public policies have a significant impact on the private return to schooling. On average, 
direct subsidies to education raise returns by 45% while personal taxes and unemployment 
benefits reduce them by 8% and 22% respectively and pensions raise them by 2.4%. In most 
countries, the combined effect of all these policies is a net subsidy to education. This subsidy 
exceeds 40% in Denmark, Portugal, Austria and Sweden, and has an average value of 18.6% in 
the entire sample. The only country where the net tax on schooling is positive is Spain, with an 
effective tax rate of 12.8%.   
Our results indicate that in most countries the tax system generates only modest disincentives 
to invest in further education at observed average attainment levels. On the the other hand, 
distortions arising from unemployment insurance can be very important in countries where 
unemployment rates are high and a significant fraction of the benefits of schooling come 
through an increase in the probability of employment. From the point of view of minimizing 
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such distortions, it would be preferable to uncap unemployment benefits while reducing 
average replacement rates. Efficiency gains, however, must be balanced against the equity 
considerations that rightly influence the design of the social protection system.  
According to our calculations, public expenditure on post-compulsory education is at least 
partly self-financing over the long run in most EU countries. Leaving aside Sweden and 
Denmark, where educational subsidies are particularly generous, recovery ratios on public 
educational expenditure range between 40% in Austria and 240% in Ireland, with a mean value 
of 97%. This leaves the net budget cost in present value terms of an additional year of schooling 
in the average EU country at roughly 200 US dollars, working under conservative assumptions 
that include full government funding of all educational costs. 
Policy implications regarding educational finance should be drawn with some care, particularly 
in the absence of reliable estimates of social returns that may be used to gauge the potential 
misalignment between private incentives and social needs. We see our finding that government 
expenditure in education largely pays for itself over time in most countries as a good reason for 
governments not to subordinate educational policies to short-term budget concerns. In our 
view, however, the balance of our findings does not necessarily imply that additional 
educational subsidies are called for. For most countries, the premium on human capital relative 
to financial assets is large enough to suggest that the incentives to enroll in post-compulsory 
courses are already quite adequate. This is true in part because existing subsidy levels are quite 
high. In all EU countries but one, such subsidies more than offset the disincentives created by 
taxes and by the social protection system.  
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 APPENDIX 1: Data and detailed results 
 
 1. The direct costs of schooling 
This section describes the construction of the direct cost of schooling variables (µ, µs, µg and 
µg'). As noted in the text, these variables are weighted averages of costs per student at the 
secondary and tertiary levels measured as a fraction of APW earnings. The primary data are 
taken from various recent issues of the OECD's Education at a Glance, to which we will refer as 
EAG. 
 
 a. Secondary education 
Table A.1 summarizes the available data on educational expenditure at the secondary level. 
Column [1] shows total expenditure per student (in public and private educational institutions) 
in 1997 measured as a percentage of GDP per capita and column [2] shows the share of this 
expenditure that is publicly financed. Multiplying [1] by [2] we obtain public expenditure per 
student (column[4]) and private expenditure as a residual (column [3]). The data refer mostly to  
 
Table A.1: Expenditure per student as a percentage of GDP per capita 
secondary level 
________________________________________________ 
  [1] [2] [3] [4]  
  total %gov't private public  
 Austria 36% 97.0% 1.1% 34.9%  
 Belgium* 29% 94.0% 1.7% 27.3%  
 Denmark 28% 98.0% 0.6% 27.4%  
 Finland 25% 99.4% 0.1% 24.9%  
 France 31% 95.0% 1.6% 29.5%  
 Germany 28% 97.0% 0.8% 27.2%  
 Greece 19% 90.2% 1.9% 17.1%  
 Ireland 19% 97.0% 0.6% 18.4%  
 Italy 29% 100.0% 0.0% 29.0%  
 Netherlands 23% 96.0% 0.9% 22.1%  
 Portugal 29% 99.9% 0.0% 29.0%  
 Spain 27% 88.0% 3.2% 23.8%  
 Sweden 27% 100.0% 0.0% 27.0%  
 UK 23% 88.2% 2.7% 20.3%  
        avge. EU14 26.64% 95.7% 1.09% 25.55%  
________________________________________________ 
    - Sources and notes: 
 [1] EAG 2000 (Table B4.2 with data for 1997). We use "all secondary" rather than "upper secondary" 
because these data are available for more countries. The one exception is Italy. The data for this country 
refer to 1998 and are taken from EAG 2001. 
 [2]  These data are only available for tertiary studies and for all other levels combined, so we use the 
second category. The main source is EAG 2000 (Table B2.1 with data for 1997). For this year, the data refer 
to the initial source of funds.  For Finland, Greece, Portugal and the UK (shown in bold type), the source is 
EAG 2002 (Table B4.2 with data for 1999). As noted in the text, these data refer to shares in final 
expenditure.       
 (*) The data for Belgium refer to the Flanders region. 
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1997 and the main source is the 2000 edition of Education at a Glance (EAG 2000). Exceptions are 
highlighted in bold type and discussed in the notes to the table and in the following paragraph. 
For most countries, the data on the share of government financing given in column [2] refer to 
the initial source of funds. For the countries shown in bold type, however, the data come from a 
different issue of EAG and refer to final expenditure after transfers from the public to the 
private sector (i.e. describe who pays in the end, and not where the money originally came 
from). For the UK, however, EAG gives the share of private (final) expenditure which is 
financed by public transfers. Hence, we subtract these transfers from private spending and add 
them to public expenditure before computing the government's share in the financing of 
educational institutions. For Finland, EAG reports that the amount of such transfers is 
"negligible." For the remaining countries there is no information on subsidies, and we implicitly 
assume they are zero. Since private final expenditure is extremely low in Portugal the resulting 
mistake will be insignificant. For Greece, however, the margin of error is considerably larger. To 
indicate this, we use bold italics for this country in columns [3] and [4]. As in the text, we will 
use this character type to identify results that are based on incomplete information when this is 
not expected to be a source of substantial errors, and plain bold type to identify results where 
the error caused by incomplete data is potentially important for the calculations. 
For Germany, EAG (2000) reports a share of public expenditure of only 76%. It also indicates, 
however, that in this country "nearly all private expenditure is accounted for by contributions 
from the business sector to the dual system of apprenticeship at the upper secondary level"(p. 
62).25 Since we are interested in the cost of education to households, we will treat enterprise 
contributions as public expenditure. As no specific figure is given for enterprise contributions, 
we will assume a share of "public" expenditure (including business contributions) of 97%, 
which is the value observed in Austria.  
 
 b. Higher education 
Table A.2 replicates Table A.1 for the case of higher education to obtain preliminary estimates 
of total, private and public expenditure per student as a percentage of GDP per capita. As 
above, the available data on the government's share refer to final expenditures for the countries 
shown in bold type in column [2] and to the initial source of funds for the rest. In Finland, the 
share of private expenditure financed by public transfers is negligible. For the other countries 
there is no information on this variable but, given the small size of overall private final 
expenditure, the potential error caused by our implicit assumption that such transfers are zero 
is small. 
 
 
 
                                                
25 We thank L. Wössmann for pointing this out. 
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Table A.2: Expenditure per student as a percentage of GDP per capita 
tertiary level: i) preliminary estimates 
________________________________________________ 
  [1] [2] [3] [4]  
  total %gov't private public  
 Austria 43% 98.7% 0.6% 42.4%  
 Belgium* 33% 90.0% 3.3% 29.7%  
 Denmark 29% 99.0% 0.3% 28.7%  
 Finland 35% 97.4% 0.9% 34.1%  
 France 34% 88.0% 4.1% 29.9%  
 Germany 43% 93.0% 3.0% 40.0%  
 Greece 29% 99.9% 0.0% 29.0%  
 Ireland 39% 79.0% 8.2% 30.8%  
 Italy 28% 82.0% 5.0% 23.0%  
 Netherlands 45% 97.0% 1.4% 43.7%  
 Portugal 28% 98.0% 0.6% 27.4%  
 Spain 32% 77.0% 7.4% 24.6%  
 Sweden 64% 91.0% 5.8% 58.2%  
 UK 40% 88.0% 4.8% 35.2%  
        avge. EU15 37.3% 91.3% 3.23% 34.05%  
________________________________________________ 
    - Sources and notes: 
 [1] The source is EAG 2000 (Table B4.2 with data for all tertiary programmes in 1997) except in the 
cases of Italy and Portugal. The Italian data refer to 1998 and are taken from EAG 2001. The information 
for Portugal is from EAG 2002 and refers to 1999. 
 [2]  The main source is EAG 2000 (Table B2.1 with data for tertiary education in 1997). For this year, the 
data refer to the initial source of funds. For Austria, Finland and Greece (shown in bold type), the source is 
EAG 2002 (Table B4.2 with data for 1999). As in the previous table, these data refer to shares in final 
expenditure.      
 (*) The data for Belgium refer to the Flanders region. 
 
The preliminary figures given in Table A.2 have to be adjusted to eliminate the cost of research 
carried out in universities and to reflect public transfers to students that are intended to help 
defray living expenses and other non-tuition costs. (Notice that our preliminary public 
expenditure figures already incorporate tuition grants since the share of government reflects the 
initial source of funds destined for educational institutions). The data required for these 
adjustments are given in Table A.3. Column [5] shows the share of R&D expenditure in total 
spending on tertiary-level educational institutions. Column [6] shows public subsidies to 
households to cover student living costs and non-tuition expenses, measured as a percentage of 
GDP per capita. 
Bold entries in Table A.3 indicate missing observations that have been estimated in various 
ways. We have imputed to those countries for which the share of R&D is missing the values 
observed in close neighbours or in countries with similar income levels (see the notes to the 
table). When data on subsidies are not available, an approximation has been constructed using 
related information from a different issue of EAG which is shown in column [7]. This column 
gives an estimate of the amount of public subsidies for living costs and other non-tuition 
expenses measured as a fraction of government direct expenditure on tertiary educational 
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institutions. The numerator is financial aid to students (scholarships and other grants) net of the 
amount earmarked for the payment of tution fees when available. The bold entries in column 
[6] are obtained by multiplying [7] by direct government expenditure on educational 
institutions (column [4] in Table A.2).  
 
 
Table A.3: Expenditure per student as a percentage of GDP per capita 
tertiary level: ii) data for adjustments 
______________________________________ 
  [5] [6]** [7]   
  sh. R&D subsidies sh. subs.   
 Austria 0.381 6.62%*    
 Belgium  0.367 5.62% 0.189   
 Denmark 0.272 17.42%    
 Finland 0.356 7.02%    
 France 0.156 1.82%    
 Germany 0.381 4.67%    
 Greece 0.227 1.02% 0.035   
 Ireland 0.164 7.44%    
 Italy 0.241 2.73% 0.119   
 Netherlands 0.393 7.78%    
 Portugal 0.227 1.28%    
 Spain 0.241 1.46%    
 Sweden 0.480 22.72%    
 UK 0.359 6.92%    
        avge. EU14 0.303 6.75%    
______________________________________ 
   - Sources and notes: 
 [5] EAG 2002 (Table B6.2 with data for tertiary education in 1999). Since no data are available for 
Austria, Italy and Portugal, we assign to these countries the values observed in Germany, Spain and 
Greece, respectively. 
 [6]  EAG 2000 (Table B3.2 with data for 1997, except for Germany, where it is for 1996). No data are 
available for Belgium, Greece and Ireland. The figures given for these countries are estimated as explained 
in the text using [7]. 
 (*) For Austria, there is no breakdown between subsidies earmarked for the payment of tuition fees 
and the rest. We assume that all subsidies are for living costs, as the data in Table A.2 suggests that the 
government pays directly for the bulk of the costs of educational institutions. 
 (**) The information available in EAG includes the fraction of total transfers (including those for tuition 
costs) that corresponds to student loans. We assume that only 25% of the amount of the loan is a subsidy 
and that this subsidy finances tuition and non-tuition costs in the same proportion. To correct the original 
figure for non-tuition transfers, we reduce it by one fourth of the share of loans in total transfers. 
 [7] EAG 2002 (Table B5.2 with information for tertiary education in 1999).  
 
Table A.4 shows the adjusted estimates of private, public and total expenditure per student at 
the tertiay level measured as a percentage of GDP per capita. Adjusted total expenditure is 
obtained by subtracting R&D spending from the uncorrected total. Adjusted public expenditure 
is raw public expenditure minus research expenditure (which we attribute exclusively to the 
government) plus transfers to students for non-tuition costs. Adjusted private expenditure is 
gross private expenditure minus subsidies for non-tuition costs. Bold italics are used for total 
and public costs in Austria, Italy and Portugal because, as noted above, there is no data on 
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research expenditure by universities. Finally, the column labeled adjusted public'  is calculated 
by adding subsidies to the adjusted total costs. This variable tries to approximate the public cost 
per student of an increase in enrollments totally financed by the government under the 
assumption that the current level of non-tuition related transfers is maintained. 
 
Table A.4: Expenditure per student as a percentage of GDP per capita 
tertiary level: iii) adjusted estimates 
________________________________________________ 
  [8] [9] [10] [11]  
  adjusted 
total 
adjusted 
private 
adjusted 
public 
adjusted 
public' 
 
 Austria 26.64% -6.06% 32.70% 33.26%  
 Belgium  20.90% -2.32% 23.22% 26.52%  
 Denmark 21.10% -17.13% 38.23% 38.52%  
 Finland 22.54% -6.11% 28.66% 29.57%  
 France 28.68% 2.26% 26.42% 30.50%  
 Germany 26.64% -1.66% 28.30% 31.31%  
 Greece 22.41% -0.99% 23.40% 23.43%  
 Ireland 32.61% 0.75% 31.86% 40.05%  
 Italy 21.25% 2.31% 18.94% 23.98%  
 Netherlands 27.33% -6.43% 33.76% 35.11%  
 Portugal 21.64% -0.72% 22.36% 22.92%  
 Spain 24.28% 5.90% 18.39% 25.75%  
 Sweden 33.27% -16.96% 50.23% 55.99%  
 UK 25.62% -2.12% 27.75% 32.55%  
        avge. EU14 25.35% -3.52% 28.87% 32.10%  
________________________________________________ 
    - Note: the adjusted estimates shown in columns [8] to [10] are calculated as follows: 
  adjusted total = total * (1 - sh. R&D), i.e. [8] = [1] * (1 - [5]) 
  adjusted private = private - subsidies,  i.e. [9] = [3] - [6] 
  adjusted public = public - (sh.R&D*total) + subsidies, i.e. [10] = [4] - ([1]*[5]) + [6] 
  adjusted public' = adjusted total + subsidies,  i.e [11] = [8] + [6] 
 
 
 c. Total expenditure 
We average expenditure per student across educational levels, using a weight of 2/3 for 
secondary schooling and of 1/3 for higher education. The results are shown in Table A.5, which 
gives average expenditure per student as a percentage of GDP per capita. For the rate of return 
calculations we will want to express total expenditure per student as a fraction of APW gross 
earnings. To obtaine the values of µ, µs, µg and µg' shown in Table 7 in the text, we multiply the 
figures shown in columns [1]-[4]  of Table A.5 by the ratio of GDP per capita to APW gross 
earnings, which is shown in column [5]. This ratio is calculated using data for 1999 taken from 
the country chapters of the OECD's Benefit Systems and Work Incentives 1999  and from the 2002 
edition of Education at a Glance (Table X2.2). 
Entries in bold italics in columns [1] to [4] are carried over from previous tables. The entry for 
Portugal in column [4] is shown in bold type because Portuguese APW earnings are atypically 
low relative to GDP per capita. As a result, Portuguese expenditure per student will appear to 
be rather high when normalized by APW wages. Since we are not sure reported Portuguese 
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APW earnings are an adequate indicator of average wages and since their use will have a 
noticeable effect on the rate of return calculations, the values of the cost variables reported in 
Table 7 for Portugal, as well as the APW wage, Wo, will be shown in bold type to indicate that 
these data may be misleading. 
 
Table A.5: Expenditure per student as a % of GDP per capita 
weighted average of secondary and (adjusted) tertiary levels 
_______________________________________________________________ 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
  total private public public' GDPpc/APW 
earnings 
 Austria 32.88% -1.30% 34.18% 35.09% 1.075 
 Belgium  26.30% 0.39% 25.91% 28.17% 0.816 
 Denmark 25.70% -5.34% 31.04% 31.51% 0.832 
 Finland 24.18% -1.94% 26.12% 26.52% 0.947 
 France 30.23% 1.79% 28.44% 30.83% 1.084 
 Germany 27.55% 0.01% 27.54% 29.10% 0.773 
 Greece 20.14% 0.91% 19.23% 20.48% 1.071 
 Ireland 23.54% 0.63% 22.91% 26.02% 1.156 
 Italy 26.42% 0.77% 25.65% 27.33% 0.957 
 Netherlands 24.44% -1.53% 25.97% 27.04% 0.876 
 Portugal 26.55% -0.22% 26.77% 26.97% 1.488 
 Spain 26.09% 4.13% 21.97% 26.58% 0.983 
 Sweden 29.09% -5.65% 34.74% 36.66% 1.026 
 UK 23.87% 1.10% 22.77% 26.18% 0.852 
        avge. EU14 26.21% -0.45% 26.66% 28.46% 0.995 
_______________________________________________________________ 
- Note: Weighted average of the values shown in Tables A.1 and A.4 with weights of 2/3 and 1/3 
respectively. (For public' we use column [1] of Table A.1 and column [4] of Table A.4). In the case of 
Germany, the public expenditure shown in column [3] includes enterprise contributions to vocational 
training programmes. The contribution of this item to combined or total educational expenditure per 
student amounts to 3.03% of APW gross earnings. 
 
 
 2. Further details on the estimation of tax and benefit parameters 
The country chapters of OECD (2000) and OECD (2001) contain a description of the personal tax 
system (including employee social security contributions) in member states in 1999 and 2000 
respectively. OECD (2000) also describes the social protection system in each country, focusing 
on unemployment benefits and social assistance but not on pension schemes, and describes in 
greater detail than OECD (2001) the tax treatment of social benefits.  
Both publications contain a set of tables at the end of each chapter where they describe the tax 
and benefit position of several types of representative individuals, including a single person 
with no children whose earnings in employment were equal to APW wages, and some of the 
relevant tax or replacement rates. For a number of countries, the description of the tax system is 
ambiguous or incomplete at times and we have been unable to reproduce exactly the tax and 
benefit amounts given in the tables, but the discrepancies are minor in all cases. Whenever 
possible, we have relied on the tables (or on summary tables containing average and marginal 
tax rates that are included in the OECD's on-line tax database) rather than on the text, as it 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
seems reasonable to assume that the OECD staff who produce these tables have more 
information about the peculiarities of tax and benefit systems than is contained in the 
descriptions given in these publications. 
Thus, marginal and average tax rates and employer social security contributions for employed 
workers have been taken directly from the OECD tax database and coincide with those given in 
the appropriate country tables of OECD (2001a). The average tax rate applicable to unemployed 
workers (τu) and the average gross replacement ratio (b, defined as the ratio of gross income out 
of employment to before-tax income in employment) have also been generally constructed by 
using directly the amounts given in the end-of-chapter tables in OECD (2000). The average 
replacement ratio is obtained by adding housing benefits to unemployment insurance and 
dividing the result by APW wages. The average tax rate is calculated by dividing total tax 
payments (personal taxes and social security) by the sum of unemployment and housing 
benefits. The only country where we have deviated slightly from the end-of-chapter tables is 
Italy. For this country, we treat the housing benefit as a tax deduction (which is the form that it 
takes according to the description in the text), rather than as a cash payment, which seems to be 
the way it is treated in the end-of-chapter table. 
We have had to use the description of the national tax and benefit systems to calculate the 
average tax rate on student income from part-time work and the marginal tax rate on 
unemployment benefits. In the case of students, our calculations are based on OECD (2001a). In 
most countries existing tax allowances or zero-rate brackets are such that student part-time 
workers earning 20% of APW wages will pay no income tax. The exceptions are the Nordic 
countries, where they would be subject to proportional local taxes. In most countries, however, 
employee social security contributions would have to be paid at standard rates. The exceptions 
to this norm are the UK, which exempts wages below a certain level from these contributions, 
and Ireland where they are exempted from most but not all social contributions. In the case of 
Denmark, we have assumed that young part-time workers opt out of certain unemployment 
and pension schemes that appear to be voluntary. 
Marginal tax rates for unemployed workers are constructed using the information given in 
OECD (2000) taking into account the deductibility of social security contributions from income 
tax where appropriate. Since this parameter is only relevant when the marginal replacement 
ratio, B', is different from zero (because it enters the calculations only as a product with B'), we 
have not calculated it for countries where benefits are paid at a fixed rate or benefit ceilings 
apply to our reference worker. As noted in the text, for this calculation we have treated housing 
benefits as lump sum payments. As a result, our marginal tax rates do not incorporate the loss 
of these benefits that would result from increases in unemployment insurance payments 
(reflecting higher wages in previous employment). In order for our calculations to be consistent 
with the end-of-chapter tables in terms of the total tax due, we have assumed that in the 
Netherlands the unemployed only contribute to the general social security schemes, and not to 
employee schemes, and that in Finland the unemployed are subject only to contributions to the 
sickness insurance fund and not to the old age pension fund. The second assumption 
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contradicts the text, which states that both types of contributions are levied on the unemployed. 
In the case of France, the marginal tax rate has been computed numerically, by calculating the 
tax increase generated by a one-franc increase in gross benefits. The reason is that the tax 
system in this country is quite complicated in a number of respects that include the (partial) 
deductibility of social contributions from income tax, the calculation of tax deductions and the 
final correction of income tax (décote) that reduces the total tax burden at low income levels but 
greatly increases the marginal tax rate. 
The marginal gross replacement ratio (B'), and the net replacement ratio in the case of Austria 
and Germany, have also been calculated using the description of benefit systems given in 
OECD (2000). In these two countries, unemployment benefits are not taxed and are set as a 
fixed fraction (β) of after-tax income in employment. In the remaining countries, benefits are 
either paid at fixed rates or are proportional to gross income in employment, possibly with a 
ceiling that we have taken into account in our calculations (by setting B' equal to zero when the 
ceiling is binding for our reference individual). Finland uses a mixed system with a fixed and a 
variable component. In this country, daily benefits are equal to the sum of three components: a 
basic, fixed-rate benefit (FRB), plus 42% of daily reference earnings in excess of the basic benefit, 
plus 20% of daily reference earnings in excess of a higher amount (which is still lower than the 
reference earnings of our representative individual). Reference earnings are defined as 95% of 
gross daily earnings. Hence, the marginal rate for benefits corresponding to APW wages is 
given by 0.95*(0.42+0.20) = 0.589.  
 
  Pension benefits and taxes on pensioners 
Our data on pension benefits are taken from OECD (2005) and refer to the year 2002.  
 
Table A.6: Pension indexation practices and assumptions 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 pensions indexed to: 
assumed 
ω 
Austria discretionary 0 
Belgium prices 0 
Denmark prices 0 
Finland 80% prices, 20% wages 0,20% 
France prices 0 
Germany wages 1% 
Greece discretionary 0 
Ireland wages 1% 
Italy prices (75% to 100% depending on amount) 0 
Netherlands wages 1% 
Portugal prices 0 
Spain prices 0 
Sweden wages - 1.6% 0 
UK prices 0 
_________________________________________________________________ 
       - Source: OECD (2005), Table 2.3, pp.35-6. 
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Table A.6 summarizes the pension indexation practices of the countries in our sample. In most 
of them pensions, once granted, grow in line with an index of consumer prices. In some of 
them, however, pensions are indexed totally or partially to average wages while in others 
increases in existing pensions are discretionary. The last column shows our assumption about 
the real rate of growth of pensions (ω). When they are indexed to prices, pensions remain 
constant in real terms and we set ω  = 0. When they are indexed to wages, they grow in real 
terms at the same rate as wages (g = 1%). Following the OECD, we have assumed that pensions 
are indexed to prices in those countries where pension increases are discretionary. We have 
made the same assumption in Sweden, where the growth rate of pensions is set to the growth 
rate of average earnings minus 1.6 percentage points. The reason is that under our assumptions 
about real wage growth (of 1%), this would imply a loss in the real value of pensions that we do 
not find plausible in the long run. 
The OECD calculates benefit entitlements (under mandatory pension schemes) for individuals 
with a full career of contributions (from age 20 until the statutory retirement age) under the 
assumption that all workers’ real wages increase at a uniform rate (of 2% per year). One 
implication of these assumptions is that an individual’s income remains constant throughout 
his career when expressed as a fraction of APW wages. As a result, the gross replacement ratio 
the OECD calculates can be interpreted as the ratio of the initial pension to either the gross 
wage at the time of retirement or the worker’s average wage throughout his career when this 
average is calculated revalorizing past wages in line with average earnings growth. For the 
average individual, in addition, both of these variables will also be equal to current APW 
wages. 
Our assumptions are somewhat different. As the reader will recall we assume a lower rate of 
average wage growth (1%) but allow individual wages to rise over time with experience (at an 
annual rate of 1.38%), so our assumed rate of growth of individual wages is a bit higher than 
the OECD’s. On the other hand, the working lives of our representative agents would be shorter 
than assumed by the OECD since we use observed average retirement ages, which are lower 
than statutory ages. On balance, however, the two sets of assumptions should be sufficiently 
close for us to be able to use the OECD’s estimates of pension levels in our calculations. 
Under our assumptions, each individual’s wages will increase over time relative to APW wages 
and final and average wages will differ. Hence, we will interpret the gross replacement ratios 
provided by the OECD as the ratio of the initial pension to the worker’s average earnings 
(which coincides with APW wages for our hypothetical representative individual). We will then 
adjust this variable as required under our assumptions to recover the ratio of the starting 
pension to final wages, which is one of the parameters (pb) that enter our calculations. We will 
use estimated benefit levels at different levels of average income (100% and 150% of APW 
wages) to calculate a marginal benefit ratio (PB’) that will measure the increase in initial pension 
entitlements resulting from a 1 euro increase in average work earnings. 
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Table A.7: Gross and marginal pension replacement ratios 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 starting pension/APW wages 
marginal 
benefit ratio 
PB' 
gross re-
placement ratio 
pb 
P/APW wage 
at midpoint of 
retirement 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
income level = 100% APW 150% APW 100% APW 100% APW 100% APW 
Austria 78,30% 117,45% 78,30% 59,35% 70,8% 
Belgium 40,70% 52,35% 23,30% 30,91% 36,5% 
Denmark 43,30% 45,45% 4,30% 32,10% 40,0% 
Finland 71,50% 107,25% 71,50% 53,55% 66,4% 
France 52,90% 76,05% 46,30% 39,54% 48,0% 
Germany 45,80% 68,70% 45,80% 34,63% 45,8% 
Greece 84,00% 126,00% 84,00% 60,51% 77,4% 
Ireland 30,60% 30,60% 0,00% 22,19% 30,6% 
Italy 78,80% 118,20% 78,80% 57,67% 71,8% 
Netherlands 68,30% 102,45% 68,30% 51,72% 68,3% 
Portugal 66,70% 98,85% 64,30% 47,79% 62,5% 
Spain 81,20% 121,80% 81,20% 58,91% 74,6% 
Sweden 64,80% 96,90% 64,20% 47,24% 59,6% 
UK 37,10% 43,95% 13,70% 27,25% 34,3% 
      average 60,29% 86,14% 51,71% 44,53% 56,18% 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
- Source: Columns [1] and [2] from OECD (2005), Table 4.1, p. 49. Column [2] has been renormalizad to 
show the starting pension as a fraction of APW wages. 
 
 
Table A.7 shows the original OECD data and the estimated values of some of the magnitudes 
required for our calculations. Columns [1] and [2] show the starting pensions corresponding to 
average earnings of 100% and 150% of APW wages expressed in both cases as a percentage of 
APW wages. Dividing the difference between these two magnitudes by the difference in 
average earnings as a fraction of APW wages (i.e. by 0.5), we obtain the marginal benefit ratio 
(PB’) shown in column [3].26 
Next, we want to calculate the gross replacement rate for the average individual expressed as a 
fraction of his final salary. As we do throughout the paper, we identify APW wages with the 
wage of an agent of average attainment, Xo, at the mid-point of his career, that is, with  
 Wo(t) = Aoegt f S(Xo )( )evHo /2  
where  Ho ≡   U – Xo is the expected duration of the working life of an individual of average 
attainment. On the other hand, wages at retirement for the average individual are given by 
 WU =W (U,Xo ,U ! Xo ) = Aoe(g+" )U f S(Xo )( )e!"Xo  
Hence, the ratio between the two quantities is given by 
                                                
26 While this is only an approximation to the true marginal benefit ratio, the approximation should be quite 
good, as benefits appear to be an approximately linear function of average earnings over the relevant income 
range in all countries in our sample. See OECD (2005) p. 57 and country chapters. 
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We calculate the value of the ratio given in (A.1) for each country using the estimated value of 
Ho in each case. Dividing column [1] by this ratio, we obtain the desired gross replacement rate 
(pb), which is shown in column [4]. That is, we calculate 
 (A.2) pb = PU (Xo )
WU (Xo )
=
PU (Xo )
Wo (U )
Wo (U )
WU (Xo )
==
PU (Xo )
Wo (U )
1
e
!Ho / 2
 
Finally, we want to estimate the ratio of the average worker’s pension to contemporaneous 
APW wages at the midpoint of the period between retirement and the expected time of death, U 
+ (Z – U)/2. Since average wages grow by assumption at a constant rate g = 1% and a retired 
person’s pension grows  at a rate ω  (see Table A.6) we have 
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Hence, to get the desired quantity we need to divide column [1] by the exponential function 
shown in (A.3). The result is shown in column [5]. 
 
Table A.8: Midpoint average and marginal tax rates on pension income 
_______________________________________ 
 
average 
τp 
marginal 
T’p 
Austria 16,72% 33,73% 
Belgium  15,84% 28,63% 
Denmark 28,03% 39,80% 
Finland 25,93% 37,87% 
France 9,91% 23,44% 
Germany 3,80% 3,80% 
Greece 1,37% 5,00% 
Ireland 0,00% 0,00% 
Italy 16,94% 25,50% 
Netherlands 13,88% 20,05% 
Portugal 2,11% 14,00% 
Spain 9,75% 28,62% 
Sweden 27,45% 30,38% 
UK 0,92% 10,00% 
average 12,33% 21,49% 
_______________________________________ 
 
Estimates of “mid-retirement” earnings relative to APW wages have been used to calculate the 
average and marginal tax rates applicable to pensioners. Multiplying the ratios shown in 
column [5] of Table A.7 by APW wages in the year of reference, we obtain an estimate of 
pensioner income. As above, we use the description of national tax systems given in OECD 
(2001) to calculate our agent’s income tax liability and social security contributions. We 
supplement this source with the additional notes on the peculiarities of the taxation of 
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pensioners that are given in the country chapters of OECD (2005) and, for some countries, in a 
special section of OECD (2001).27 The results of our calculations are shown in Table A.8. As 
above, the marginal tax rate for France has been computed numerically and marginal tax rates 
have been calculated taking into account the deductibility of social security contributions from 
income taxes whenever relevant. 
 
 3. Correction for differential student employment probabilities and activity rates 
Casual observation suggests that, at least in some countries, finding a part-time or summer job 
while attending school may be harder than finding a full-time job, and that the propensity of 
students to enter the labour market tends to be much lower than that of those who have 
completed their education. Since these factors can have an important effect on the opportunity 
cost of education and hence on its private return, they should be taken into account in our 
calculations. 
 
Table A.9: Probability of employment, population 20-24 in and out of school 
________________________________________________________________ 
                                                in education                  not in education                   η = ratio in/not in edu. 
  [1] [2] [3] [4]  [5] [6] 
  p q p q  η ηq 
 Austria 92.45% 19.34% 94.62% 87.05%  0.977 0.222 
 Belgium  87.50% 16.33% 86.12% 89.07%  1.016 0.183 
 Denmark 90.91% 69.62% 92.93% 91.93%  0.978 0.757 
 Finland 82.40% 46.38% 83.86% 82.00%  0.983 0.566 
 France 95.12% 22.95% 79.57% 89.46%  1.195 0.257 
 Germany 98.37% 52.42% 89.69% 83.41%  1.097 0.628 
 Greece 65.79% 10.38% 74.17% 85.35%  0.887 0.122 
 Ireland 93.22% 20.85% 94.98% 91.63%  0.982 0.228 
 Italy 64.00% 12.95% 75.21% 77.52%  0.851 0.167 
 Netherlands 95.35% 62.50% 96.44% 89.94%  0.989 0.695 
 Portugal 91.55% 19.94% 91.33% 91.30%  1.002 0.218 
 Spain 74.26% 22.44% 82.39% 89.82%  0.901 0.250 
 Sweden 85.29% 32.69% 90.43% 91.27%  0.943 0.358 
 UK 93.41% 54.33% 91.18% 85.39%  1.024 0.636 
          average EU14 85.94% 34.14% 86.79% 87.55%  0.988 0.390 
________________________________________________________________ 
 - Source: EAG 2003 (Table C4.1) with data for 2001. 
 
To calculate the required correction factors (η and ηq) we have used data on the probability of 
employment of the 20 to 24 age group in 1998 taken from the 2003 edition of Education at a 
Glance. Columns [1] to [4] of Table A.9 show the probability of employment of this group 
conditional on participation in the labour force (p) and its labour force participation rate (q), 
distinguishing between those enrolled in educational institutions and those who have already 
                                                
27 In most countries retirees are either totally or partially exempt from social security contributions. In 
some of them, they have access to special tax allowances or are taxed on only a fraction of their pension 
income. 
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completed their formal schooling. Columns [5] and [6] show preliminary estimates of the 
correction factors, η and ηq. These variables are constructed by dividing the relevant 
employment probability or participation rate for those attending school by its counterpart for 
those out of school.  
To go from Table A.9 to Table 7 in the text (which shows the values of the correction factors that 
are used in the rate of return calculations), we assign a value of 1 to countries where the 
preliminary estimate of η shown here exceeds that value --that is, we assume that, other things 
equal, it is never easier to find part-time employment as a student than a full-time job. 
 
 4. Academic failure rates 
As noted in the text, we distinguish between completed school grades, S, and time spent in 
school, X where S = S(X) with 0 < S'(X) < 1. To calculate the rate of return we need to estimate 
Xo and S'(Xo). To do this properly, we would need data on repetition and drop-out rates at 
different levels of schooling. Since these data are apparently not available, we have constructed 
a very rough approximation of year-by-year drop out probabilities using the data provided by 
the OECD (EAG 2002) on upper secondary and university survival rates.  
We will assume that whenever a student starts one of these cycles but leaves school without 
completing it, the last year spent in school is wasted, and that this is the only type of academic 
failure that takes place. This is clearly incorrect for two reasons that will generate opposing 
biases in our estimates. First, we are ignoring repeaters, which will lead us to underestimate 
failure rates and effective completion times and, second, we are not taking into account that 
students may leave in mid-cycle after successfully completing a grade in order to take up a job 
or for other reasons. Since the first of these effects can be expected to be greater than the second 
one, it is likely that we are underestimating failure rates. 
Under our assumptions, we can approximate S' by the one-year probability of survival in 
school, which we will denote by σ. The OECD provides estimates of survival rates in tertiary 
education that are calculated as the ratio between the number of graduates in a given year and 
the number of incoming students in the typical year of entrance into the programme.  These 
estimates, which are shown in column [1] of Table A.10, reflect the probability of survival 
during the entire duration of the university cycle, that is, the probability that a student who 
enters university will eventually graduate. Calling the overall survival rate Σ, denoting by d the 
theoretical duration of university, and assuming that the probability of failure is the same for all 
years in the cycle, we have Σ = σd, which can be solved for the one-year survival probability, σ 
= Exp(ln Σ/d). Then, the expected (actual) duration of university can be approximated by D = 
d/σ, where 1/σ is the average time it takes to complete a grade. The original data and the results 
of the calculations are shown in Table A.10. The missing observation for Greece is filled by 
setting the value of σ for this country equal to the average value of those corresponding to 
Portugal and Spain. 
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Table A.10: Estimates of university survival rates 
_________________________________________________ 
  whole 
cycle 
duration yearly 
survival 
years per 
grade 
adjusted 
duration 
  
  
Σ d σ 1/σ    D   
 Austria 0.59 4 0.876 1.141 4.564   
 Belgium  0.60 4 0.880 1.136 4.545   
 Denmark 0.69 4 0.911 1.097 4.389   
 Finland 0.75 5 0.944 1.059 5.296   
 France 0.59 4 0.876 1.141 4.564   
 Germany 0.70 4 0.915 1.093 4.373   
 Greece  4 0.893 1.120 4.480   
 Ireland 0.85 4 0.960 1.041 4.166   
 Italy 0.42 5 0.841 1.189 5.947   
 Netherlands 0.69 5 0.928 1.077 5.385   
 Portugal 0.49 4 0.837 1.195 4.781   
 Spain 0.77 5 0.949 1.054 5.268   
 Sweden 0.48 4 0.832 1.201 4.806   
 UK 0.83 4 0.954 1.048 4.191   
          average EU14   0.900 1.114 4.768   
______________________________________________________________________ 
- Sources: Theoretical durations are from de la Fuente and Doménech (2001). Σ is taken from EAG (2002) 
(Table A2.2, survival rates for all tertiary type A programmes, with data for 2000). The only exceptions are 
Portugal and Greece. For Portugal, the data are taken from EAG (2000) and refer to 1993. For Greece there 
are no data, so we set the value of σ for this country equal to the average of Portugal and Spain. 
 
 
 
For the case of upper secondary schooling, we proceed in the same way after estimating the 
overall survival rate (which the OECD does not provide) as the ratio between the gross 
graduation rate in a given year and the net enrollment ratio in secondary education at age 15 
three years earlier. The first of these variables, which is defined as the ratio of upper secondary 
graduates to the total population of the theoretically relevant age, measures the output of 
graduates, while the second one approximates the intake of students in early years of this cycle. 
The data and the results are shown in Table A.11. For the UK there are no data on graduation 
rates, so we assume that σ has the same value as in Ireland. 
Finally, the value of S'(Xo) used in our calculations is the weighted average of the estimated 
values of σ  at the upper secondary and university levels, with weights of 2/3 and 1/3 
respectively. 
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Table A.11: Estimates of upper secondary survival rates 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 graduation 
rate 
enrollment 
at 15 
whole 
cycle 
duration yearly 
prob. 
years per 
grade 
adjusted 
duration 
 
   Σ d σ 1/σ D  
Austria 0.7 0.94 0.745 4 0.929 1.076 4.306  
Belgium  0.79 0.97 0.814 3 0.934 1.071 3.212  
Denmark 0.96 0.98 0.980 4 0.995 1.005 4.021  
Finland 0.91 1 0.910 3 0.969 1.032 3.096  
France 0.85 0.96 0.885 3 0.960 1.041 3.124  
Germany 0.92 0.98 0.939 3 0.979 1.021 3.064  
Greece 0.83 0.92 0.902 3 0.966 1.035 3.105  
Ireland 0.76 0.97 0.784 3 0.922 1.085 3.254  
Italy 0.79 0.86 0.919 5 0.983 1.017 5.086  
Netherlands 0.95 0.99 0.960 2 0.980 1.021 2.042  
Portugal 0.56 0.9 0.622 4 0.888 1.126 4.504  
Spain 0.67 0.94 0.713 4 0.919 1.088 4.353  
Sweden 0.71 0.97 0.732 3 0.901 1.110 3.329  
UK  1  3 0.922 1.085 3.254  
         average EU14     0.946 1.058 3.554  
______________________________________________________________________ 
- Sources: Theoretical durations are from de la Fuente and Doménech (2002, Table 4). Gross graduation 
rates from EAG 2003 (Table A1.1 with data corresponding generally to 2001), and net enrollment rates 
from EAG 2000 (Table C1.3, with data for 1998).  
- Notes: for Austria and the Netherlands, the total (unduplicated) graduation rate is missing; I add up 
graduation rates across programme types, which may introduce some double counting. For Greece I use 
graduation rates for 1998 taken from EAG 2000 because the 2003 figures give very low graduation rates 
that seem implausible. For Portugal, I also use EAG 2000, as graduation data are missing in EAG 2003. For 
the UK there is no data on graduation rates, so we assume σ has the same value as in Ireland. 
 
 5. Detailed results: private returns 
Tables A.12 and A.13 report the results of the participation and employment probits discussed 
in section 5. In both cases, the coefficients we report are not the direct estimates of the original 
parameters of the probit model, but the estimated marginal effects (calculated at the sample 
means of all the regressors) that measure the expected change in the relevant probability in 
response to a marginal increase in each of the explanatory variables. 
The upper panels of Tables A.14 and A.15 show the raw and all-in rates of return to schooling 
and their different cost and benefit "components." The lower panels display the normalized 
values of these variables. To interpret this table, recall the rate of return formula derived in 
Section 2 of the text which can be written 
  (29') R
1! e
! RHo
= R ' "
#
net
+ p '
net
+ PENS
OPPC + DIRC
"
NUM
DENOM
 
In this expression, θnet and p'net capture the net after-tax benefits of a marginal increase in 
schooling that are linked, respectively, to higher earnings and to higher employment 
probabilities, while PENS (which is zero in the non-government scenario) measures the 
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discounted value of pension benefits and OPPC and DIRC the opportunity and direct costs of 
schooling, with all variables measured as fractions of the expected after-tax earnings of an adult 
worker. Thus, NUM measures the total payoff to an additional year of schooling and DENOM 
its total cost. (Notice that θnet, p'net and PENS are normalized by the average value of their sum, 
NUM, and OPPC and DIRC  are normalized by the average value of DENOM). 
 
 
Table A.12: Marginal effects in the employment probit 
___________________________________________________________ 
  S potexp potexp2 male no. of observ. 
predicted 
prob.  
 Austria 0.00381 0.00074 0.00000 0.03210 5883 0.9566  
  (2.74) (0.52) (0.01) (3.82)    
 Belgium 0.01671 0.00384 -0.00004 0.04398 4201 0.9282  
  (7.51) (1.48) (0.65) (3.52)    
 Denmark 0.00531 0.00002 0.00001 0.01521 4001 0.9486  
  (3.54) (0.02) (0.27) (2.05)    
 Finland 0.01732 0.00622 -0.00006 0.01981 7201 0.8816  
  (9.32) (2.43) (1.19) (2.26)    
 France 0.01759 0.00763 -0.00008 0.04000 9184 0.9267  
  (10.99) (4.55) (2.03) (4.91)    
 Germany 0.00670 -0.00094 0.00003 0.01723 10314 0.9413  
  (5.10) (0.82) (0.89) (2.87)    
 Greece 0.01338 0.01753 -0.00023 0.11621 8801 0.8859  
  (8.62) (9.99) (5.96) (8.32)    
 Ireland 0.02376 0.00216 0.00002 -0.02042 5746 0.9174  
  (10.70) (1.46) (0.52) (1.36)    
 Italy 0.02085 0.02284 -0.00028 0.08986 14125 0.8581  
  (15.62) (12.88) (7.22) (9.08)    
 Netherlands 0.00588 -0.00061 0.00003 0.02130 7472 0.9614  
  (4.39) (0.69) (1.38) (4.42)    
 Portugal 0.00421 0.00495 -0.00006 0.02740 8903 0.9579  
  (4.51) (4.21) (2.58) (4.20)    
 Spain 0.02451 0.01549 -0.00016 0.10596 12438 0.8005  
  (14.74) (7.64) (3.71) (8.39)    
 Sweden 0.01558 0.01010 -0.00015 0.00540 7625 0.8989  
  (9.66) (8.20) (5.88) (0.75)    
 UK 0.00779 0.00131 0.00001 -0.02254 5528 0.9462  
  (5.69) (1.49) (0.29) (3.61)    
___________________________________________________________ 
- Explanatory variables: S = years of schooling: potexp = potential experience; male = dummy variable, it is 
equal to 1 for males and to 0 for females.  
-Note: t statistics in parentheses below each coefficient. Predicted prob. is the model's prediction for the 
probability of employment at the mean values of all regressors. 
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Table A.13: Marginal effects in the participation probit 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 S potexp potexp2 male married married* 
male 
children children*
male 
Austria 0.01412 0.03168 -0.00090 0.04690 0.00346 0.10533 -0.12881 0.22000 
 (5.76) (16.12) (20.63) (2.29) (0.19) (3.99) (6.44) (8.14) 
Belgium 0.02762 0.03790 -0.00099 0.06309 0.00906 0.17848 -0.04683 0.07769 
 (11.58) (16.12) (18.66) (2.55) (0.47) (5.69) (2.20) (2.22) 
Denmark 0.01074 0.02174 -0.00056 0.01729 0.01998 0.09344 -0.06255 0.06286 
 (5.00) (11.92) (14.27) (0.81) (1.19) (4.17) (3.62) (2.44) 
Finland 0.01605 0.04439 -0.00095 0.03584 0.08624 -0.01168 -0.08830 0.12441 
 (7.82) (29.52) (29.88) (2.31) (5.34) (0.48) (5.16) (6.12) 
France 0.02729 0.04423 -0.00107 0.02704 -0.05936 0.18942 -0.11084 0.17617 
 (13.44) (29.66) (33.63) (1.56) (4.00) (9.59) (7.61) (8.21) 
Germany 0.01617 0.02731 -0.00078 0.01553 -0.02672 0.09744 -0.20522 0.16018 
 (8.69) (19.57) (25.68) (1.01) (2.07) (5.47) (15.00) (10.22) 
Greece 0.01453 0.03535 -0.00083 0.01155 -0.12543 0.37983 -0.10487 0.20072 
 (8.10) (20.40) (24.37) (0.65) (6.66) (17.86) (5.66) (6.25) 
Ireland 0.03677 0.02559 -0.00068 0.16867 -0.08166 0.28036 -0.16513 0.14284 
 (12.87) (11.69) (15.24) (8.53) (3.61) (10.39) (8.17) (4.22) 
Italy 0.02213 0.05138 -0.00115 0.04667 -0.16309 0.31393 -0.09557 0.18048 
 (16.13) (32.94) (37.27) (3.54) (10.46) (19.25) (6.60) (7.30) 
Netherl. 0.01917 0.02969 -0.00089 0.00131 -0.01937 0.18805 -0.23483 0.18086 
 (7.14) (16.28) (22.84) (0.25) (0.90) (8.87) (14.94) (8.99) 
Portugal 0.01405 0.03395 -0.00073 0.08731 0.00954 0.20149 -0.03735 0.10261 
 (6.47) (21.06) (23.96) (5.68) (0.63) (10.25) (2.25) (3.81) 
Spain 0.02564 0.05237 -0.00115 0.04758 -0.19008 0.37001 -0.10246 0.16359 
 (15.07) (32.29) (35.51) (3.32) (11.65) (20.41) (6.74) (6.22) 
Sweden 0.009602 0.023926 -0.000488 0.026965 0.056125 -0.003068 -0.023953 0.051618 
 (6.53) (23.90) (22.51) (3.11) (6.07) (0.22) (2.21) (3.72) 
UK 0.00671 0.01674 -0.00053 0.03290 0.04715 0.11469 -0.24850 0.10363 
 (2.68) (9.44) (14.65) (1.28) (3.39) (5.28) (14.24) (4.80) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
- Explanatory variables: S = years of schooling: potexp = potential experience; male = dummy variable, it is 
equal to 1 for males and to 0 for females; married = dummy variable, equal to 1 for married individuals or 
those living in consensual unions with other persons; children = dummy variable for individuals with 
children under the age of twelve. 
-Note: t statistics in parentheses below each coefficient. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
63 
 
 
 
Table A.14: Raw return to schooling and its components 
 
a. Observed values 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 rno govt  NUM θnet  p'net  DENOM OPPC DIRC 
Ireland 10.98%  0.091 0.071 0.020 1.044 0.669 0.375 
UK 9.94%  0.076 0.069 0.007 0.965 0.689 0.277 
Finland 9.19%  0.069 0.054 0.015 0.956 0.650 0.306 
Spain 8.91%  0.066 0.045 0.020 0.955 0.602 0.353 
Germany 8.32%  0.064 0.058 0.006 0.974 0.692 0.282 
Greece 8.28%  0.061 0.049 0.011 0.967 0.668 0.299 
Italy 7.31%  0.055 0.038 0.018 1.004 0.659 0.345 
France 7.25%  0.062 0.048 0.015 1.117 0.679 0.438 
Belgium  7.20%  0.055 0.041 0.014 0.966 0.684 0.283 
Portugal 6.87%  0.063 0.060 0.003 1.242 0.691 0.551 
Austria 6.22%  0.057 0.054 0.003 1.176 0.710 0.466 
Netherlands 6.11%  0.048 0.043 0.005 0.993 0.710 0.283 
Denmark 5.08%  0.039 0.034 0.005 0.987 0.698 0.288 
Sweden 3.21%  0.028 0.016 0.012 1.068 0.659 0.409 
         avge. EU14 7.56%  0.059 0.048 0.011 1.029 0.675 0.354 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
b. Normalized values 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 rno govt  NUM θnet  p'net  DENOM OPPC DIRC 
Ireland 145.3  153.9 120.2 33.6 101.5 65.0 36.5 
UK 131.6  127.2 116.2 11.0 93.8 66.9 26.9 
Finland 121.6  116.3 91.1 25.2 92.9 63.2 29.7 
Spain 117.9  110.3 75.8 34.5 92.8 58.5 34.3 
Germany 110.1  107.0 97.3 9.7 94.6 67.3 27.4 
Greece 109.6  102.2 83.1 19.1 94.0 64.9 29.1 
Italy 96.7  93.3 63.7 29.5 97.6 64.0 33.6 
France 95.9  105.0 80.2 24.8 108.6 66.0 42.6 
Belgium  95.2  91.8 68.6 23.2 93.9 66.4 27.5 
Portugal 90.9  105.9 100.3 5.6 120.7 67.1 53.6 
Austria 82.3  96.6 91.4 5.3 114.3 69.0 45.3 
Netherlands 80.9  80.2 71.6 8.6 96.5 69.0 27.5 
Denmark 67.3  65.0 57.2 7.8 95.9 67.9 28.0 
Sweden 42.5  47.2 26.4 20.7 103.8 64.0 39.8 
         avge 100.0  100.0 81.5 18.5 100.0 65.6 34.4 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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Table A.15: Observed (all-in) return to schooling and its components 
 
a. Observed values 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 robs  NUM θnet  p'net  PENS DENOM OPPC DIRC 
UK 12.27%  0.050 0.047 0.003 0.000 0.497 0.484 0.013 
Ireland 11.03%  0.045 0.034 0.011 0.000 0.512 0.502 0.010 
Portugal 10.38%  0.047 0.046 0.001 0.000 0.573 0.578 -0.005 
Finland 10.16%  0.035 0.031 0.003 0.001 0.434 0.459 -0.025 
Germany 9.46%  0.028 0.025 0.001 0.001 0.368 0.368 0.000 
Greece 9.36%  0.043 0.037 0.005 0.001 0.599 0.586 0.014 
Austria 8.86%  0.034 0.032 0.001 0.001 0.488 0.507 -0.018 
France 8.80%  0.037 0.033 0.003 0.001 0.538 0.512 0.026 
Italy 8.66%  0.032 0.024 0.007 0.001 0.485 0.475 0.010 
Denmark 8.01%  0.018 0.017 0.001 0.000 0.288 0.348 -0.060 
Spain 7.77%  0.038 0.032 0.004 0.001 0.644 0.588 0.056 
Belgium  7.67%  0.022 0.018 0.003 0.001 0.358 0.354 0.004 
Netherlands 7.59%  0.023 0.021 0.001 0.002 0.391 0.409 -0.018 
Sweden 4.72%  0.014 0.010 0.003 0.001 0.389 0.468 -0.080 
          avge. EU14 8.96%  0.033 0.029 0.003 0.001 0.471 0.477 -0.005 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
b. Normalized values 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 robs  NUM θnet  p'net  PENS DENOM OPPC DIRC 
UK 136.9  151.4 142.9 8.2 0.2 105.4 102.7 2.7 
Ireland 123.2  137.4 103.3 34.1 0.0 108.7 106.6 2.1 
Portugal 115.8  142.5 139.5 1.7 1.3 121.6 122.6 -1.0 
Finland 113.5  107.0 94.2 10.6 2.2 92.1 97.3 -5.2 
Germany 105.6  84.2 76.8 4.1 3.2 78.2 78.2 0.0 
Greece 104.4  132.0 114.0 15.1 3.0 127.1 124.3 2.9 
Austria 98.9  104.0 96.9 2.7 4.4 103.6 107.5 -3.9 
France 98.2  112.7 100.3 10.0 2.4 114.2 108.7 5.5 
Italy 96.7  98.4 73.3 22.3 2.8 102.8 100.7 2.1 
Denmark 89.4  54.1 51.0 2.9 0.1 61.1 73.8 -12.7 
Spain 86.7  114.9 97.6 12.8 4.5 136.5 124.7 11.9 
Belgium  85.6  65.6 55.2 8.6 1.7 75.9 75.0 0.9 
Netherlands 84.7  70.7 63.0 1.7 6.0 83.0 86.8 -3.8 
Sweden 52.6  42.1 31.0 7.7 3.4 82.5 99.3 -16.9 
          avge. EU14 100.0  100.0 88.4 9.3 2.3 100.0 101.1 -1.1 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table A.16 shows estimates of the private rate of return to schooling under each of the scenarios 
discussed in section 3 of the text. The upper block of the table gives the actual rates of return, 
and the lower one a set of normalized rates of return that are obtained by setting the average 
value for each scenario to 100. Table A.17 shows the change in the rate of return as we move 
across scenarios (i.e. the tax or subsidy wedges defined in the text) and Table A.18 converts 
these wedges into the implied subsidy or tax rates by dividing them by the rate of return in the 
no-government scenario. 
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Table A.16: Net private rates of return to schooling under different scenarios 
____________________________________________________________ 
  NO GOV'T +subsidies + taxes + unempl. 
benefits 
+ pensions 
= OBS 
 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]  
 Austria 6.22% 10.35% 8.96% 8.52% 8.86%  
 Belgium  7.20% 9.91% 9.88% 7.47% 7.67%  
 Denmark 5.08% 7.87% 9.16% 7.99% 8.01%  
 Finland 9.19% 13.31% 12.15% 9.98% 10.16%  
 France 7.25% 11.00% 10.59% 8.63% 8.80%  
 Germany 8.32% 11.32% 9.97% 9.13% 9.46%  
 Greece 8.28% 11.16% 10.22% 9.18% 9.36%  
 Ireland 10.98% 15.82% 12.40% 11.03% 11.03%  
 Italy 7.31% 10.46% 10.08% 8.44% 8.66%  
 Netherlands 6.11% 8.73% 7.98% 6.95% 7.59%  
 Portugal 6.87% 11.44% 10.82% 10.30% 10.38%  
 Spain 8.91% 12.24% 11.59% 7.50% 7.77%  
 Sweden 3.21% 6.48% 7.18% 4.28% 4.72%  
 UK 9.94% 13.07% 13.16% 12.25% 12.27%  
         avge. EU14 7.56% 11.05% 10.43% 8.78% 8.96%  
 
  NO GOV'T +subsidies + taxes + unempl. 
benefits 
+ pensions 
= OBS 
 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]  
 Austria 82.3 93.6 85.9 97.0 98.9  
 Belgium  95.2 89.7 94.7 85.2 85.6  
 Denmark 67.3 71.3 87.9 91.1 89.4  
 Finland 121.6 120.5 116.5 113.8 113.5  
 France 95.9 99.6 101.6 98.3 98.2  
 Germany 110.1 102.5 95.6 104.0 105.6  
 Greece 109.6 101.0 98.0 104.6 104.4  
 Ireland 145.3 143.2 118.9 125.7 123.2  
 Italy 96.7 94.6 96.6 96.2 96.7  
 Netherlands 80.9 79.0 76.5 79.2 84.7  
 Portugal 90.9 103.5 103.7 117.3 115.8  
 Spain 117.9 110.8 111.1 85.4 86.7  
 Sweden 42.5 58.6 68.8 48.8 52.6  
 UK 131.6 118.3 126.2 139.6 136.9  
         avge. EU14 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  
____________________________________________________________ 
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Table A.17: tax or subsidy wedge induced by 
various public interventions 
____________________________________________________________ 
  educational 
subsidies 
personal 
taxes 
social benefits pensions 
 
all gov’t  
  [2]-[1] [2]-[3] [3]-[4] [5]-[4] [1]-[5]  
 Austria 4.13% 1.39% 0.44% 0.34% -2.64%  
 Belgium  2.72% 0.03% 2.41% 0.20% -0.47%  
 Denmark 2.79% -1.29% 1.17% 0.02% -2.93%  
 Finland 4.12% 1.16% 2.17% 0.18% -0.98%  
 France 3.75% 0.41% 1.97% 0.17% -1.55%  
 Germany 3.00% 1.35% 0.84% 0.33% -1.14%  
 Greece 2.88% 0.94% 1.04% 0.18% -1.07%  
 Ireland 4.84% 3.42% 1.37% 0.00% -0.06%  
 Italy 3.15% 0.38% 1.63% 0.22% -1.36%  
 Netherlands 2.61% 0.75% 1.03% 0.64% -1.48%  
 Portugal 4.57% 0.62% 0.52% 0.08% -3.51%  
 Spain 3.33% 0.65% 4.10% 0.27% 1.14%  
 Sweden 3.27% -0.70% 2.90% 0.43% -1.51%  
 UK 3.12% -0.09% 0.91% 0.02% -2.33%  
         avge. EU14 3.49% 0.62% 1.65% 0.18% -1.40%  
____________________________________________________________ 
 
Table A.18: Net implicit subsidy or tax rate induced by 
various public interventions 
____________________________________________________________ 
  educational 
subsidies 
personal 
taxes 
social benefits pensions 
 
all gov’t  
  [2]-[1] [2]-[3] [3]-[4] [5]-[4] [1]-[5]  
 Austria 66.40% 22.30% 7.11% 5.55% -42.54%  
 Belgium  37.76% 0.45% 33.47% 2.74% -6.59%  
 Denmark 54.88% -25.39% 22.99% 0.39% -57.66%  
 Finland 44.82% 12.57% 23.61% 1.98% -10.62%  
 France 51.76% 5.61% 27.11% 2.32% -21.36%  
 Germany 36.02% 16.23% 10.10% 3.97% -13.65%  
 Greece 34.74% 11.39% 12.56% 2.17% -12.97%  
 Ireland 44.11% 31.12% 12.45% 0.00% -0.54%  
 Italy 43.09% 5.20% 22.31% 3.01% -18.58%  
 Netherlands 42.76% 12.20% 16.82% 10.42% -24.16%  
 Portugal 66.57% 9.06% 7.54% 1.14% -51.11%  
 Spain 37.39% 7.32% 45.97% 3.06% 12.83%  
 Sweden 101.88% -21.87% 90.26% 13.51% -47.01%  
 UK 31.42% -0.93% 9.11% 0.16% -23.39%  
         avge. EU14 46.20% 8.17% 21.89% 2.42% -18.57%  
____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 6. Detailed results: fiscal returns 
Table A.19 gives our estimates of the fiscal rate of return to schooling under the different 
assumptions discussed in the text. 
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Table A.19: Fiscal rate of return on schooling 
_________________________________________________ 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
 personal 
taxes 
+ consump. 
taxes 
+ employer 
s. sec. contr. 
+ pensions = 
OBS 
Austria 0.68% 1.17% 2.11%  
Belgium  3.03% 3.15% 3.91% 3.64% 
Denmark 0.82% 1.19% 1.18% 1.02% 
Finland 3.77% 4.10% 4.92% 4.43% 
France 1.52% 2.11% 3.66% 3.12% 
Germany 3.97% 4.13% 4.70% 4.05% 
Greece 1.79% 2.54% 3.70% 2.03% 
Ireland 5.34% 5.67% 6.17% 6.14% 
Italy 1.81% 2.21% 3.39% 2.40% 
Netherlands 2.25% 2.52% 2.82%  
Portugal 0.09% 1.18% 2.42% 1.36% 
Spain 2.98% 3.37% 4.74% 4.00% 
Sweden -1.42% -1.25% -0.52% -1.70% 
UK 3.19% 3.80% 4.53% 4.35% 
     avge. EU14 2.35% 2.74% 3.58% 2.91% 
_________________________________________________ 
 
 
A number of things should be noted about these estimates. The first is that the introduction of 
pension benefits does raise some problems for their calculation, for pensions represent a large 
negative cash flow at the "end of the project" and, as is well known, this can give rise to 
multiple solutions or to the absence of them in the calculation of internal rates of return. For 
two of the countries in the sample, indeed, the fiscal rate of return equation has no solution. 
This is illustrated for the case of Austria in Figure A.1, which shows the net present fiscal value 
of schooling as a function of the discount rate. In all other cases, the rate of return equation has 
two solutions, at least one of which is negative, as illustrated in Figure A.2 for the case of the 
average EU14 country. In these cases we report the larger of the two solutions. When it is 
positive, this figure is not misleading as the net present value of schooling will be positive for 
any interest rate between zero and the reported rate of return and negative thereafter, so this is 
indeed the highest positive interest rate at which the government can borrow to finance 
educational expenditure without increasing the present value of its current and future deficits.  
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Figure A.1: Net present fiscal value of a year of schooling as a function of the discount rate, 
Austria 
 
Figure A.2: Net present fiscal value of a year of schooling as a function of the discount rate, 
average EU14 country 
 
 
 
Finally, it should be kept in mind that internal rates of return and net present values do not 
necessarily move in the same direction. Sweden is a clear example of this. Comparing table A.19 
with Table 11 in the text, we see that the introduction of consumption taxes and employer social 
security contributions increases the fiscal rate of return but reduces the net present fiscal value 
obtained with a 3% real discount rate. Since taking into account such taxes when calculating the 
returns to a marginal increase in schooling raises tax receipts in the future but also increases the 
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opportunity cost of schooling in terms of foregone tax revenues from currently active workers, 
their effect on net present values will depend on the discount rate and, as illustrated in Figure 
A.3, the resulting changes in the internal rate of return and on the net present fiscal value at a 
given discount rate may be of opposite signs. 
 
Figure A.3: Net present fiscal value of a year of schooling as a function of the discount rate, 
under different scenarios, Sweden 
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 APPENDIX 2: Detailed calculations 
 
 1. The private return to schooling 
The lifetime net income function given in the text can be written 
  (1) V(X) = 
  
 
Aoe
!Ho / 2 Fs (t )
0
X
" e#(R+! )tdt  -   
 
Ao µse
!Ho / 2 f (So) e
"(R+!) tdt
0
X
#  
    + 
  
 
Ao F(X)
X
U
! e"Rt dt +   
 
Aoe
(g +! "# )UFp X( ) e
"(R+ g+! "# )t
U
Z
$ dt   
where So ≡  S(Xo)  and 
  (2) R ≡ r - g - ν. 
Differentiating (1) with respect to X, we have 
 
  
 
V' (X) = Aoe
!Ho / 2Fs (X)e
"(R+!) X "Aoe
!H o / 2µs f (So)e
"(R +! )X
             + Ao F'( X)
X
U
# e"Rt dt "F(X)e"RX
$ 
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
& 
* 
+ Aoe
(g +! "+ )U Fp' X( ) e
"(R+ g+! "+ )t
U
Z
# dt
$ 
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
& 
* 
 
or 
 
  
 
V' (X)
Ao
= e!(R+" )Xe"Ho / 2 Fs (X) !µs f (So)[ ] !F(X)e
!RX
             + F' (X)
e!RX ! e!RU
R
+e (g +" !# )UFp' X( )
e!(R +g +" !# )U ! e!(R +g +" !# )Z
R + g +" !#
 
 
  
 
V' (X)
Ao
= e!(R+" )Xe"Ho / 2 Fs (X) !µs f (So)[ ] !F(X)e
!RX
             + F' (X)e!RX
1! e!R(U!X )
R
+ e(g +" !# )U Fp' X( )e
!(R +g +" !# )U 1! e
!(R+ g+" !# )( Z!U )
R + g +" !#
 
In this expression, notice that  
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and 
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It will be useful to define 
  (4)
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and to write equation (3) in the form 
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As discussed in the text, the functions F(), Fs() and Fp() that determine, respectively, the 
expected net-of-tax earnings of an adult active worker, a part-time student worker and a 
pensioner, are defined by 
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give, respectively, the net earnings of an employed and an unemployed adult worker per 
efficiency unit of labour. 
To rewrite equation (5) in a more convenient form, we proceed as follows. First, we define the 
average tax rates for the representative employed and unemployed adult workers, student part-
time workers and pensioners (τe, τu, τs and τp) and the gross replacement ratios, b and pb (that 
is, the ratio between gross earnings in employment and gross earnings out of employment or in 
retirement) by 
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Using these expressions, we have 
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Inserting the expressions we have just derived into the right-hand side of equation (5) and 
dividing through by  
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is the Mincerian returns to schooling parameter. This is equation (29) in the text. For some 
purposes it will be more convenient to divide through by F(Xo) =   
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%
1-"
&S '+ ' (R)
1! T '
p
p(1-" )
PB ' #S '!$( )
1!((1!))
1! "
s
1-"
e
$Ho / 2*
+,
-
./
+
µ
s
p(1-" )
e
$Ho / 2
           =
(1! 0 )# '+ (1! 1)& '+ PENS '
1!((1!))
1! "
s
1-"
e
$Ho / 2*
+,
-
./
+
µ
s
p(1-" )
e
$Ho / 2
 
where  
  (30)  
  
 
! "
p' (So )
p(So )
 
is the semielasticity of the probability of employment function and we have defined 
 (31)  
 
!'" !S' (Xo ) #$ ,    
 
!'" !S'( Xo )  and PENS ' = ! (R)
1" T '
p
p(1-# )
PB ' $S '"%( ) = ! (R)
1" T '
p
p(1-# )
PB '$ '  
The terms π and ρ are defined by 
  (32)  
  
 
1!" #
1 !T'
1! $
    %       
  
 
! = 1 "
1 "T'
1" #
=
T'"#
1 "#
 
and28 
  (33)  
  
 
! "
(1 #$u )b
p(1- $ )
     
Notice that ρ is a modified average net replacement ratio (calculated as a fraction of the 
expected net earnings of an active worker rather than as a fraction of net income in 
employment), and that π can be interpreted as a measure of progressivity. The ratio 
  
 
1!T'
1 !"
  is 
the elasticity of the expected net earnings of an adult active worker with respect to gross 
earnings in employment. 
 
 A special case 
The above derivation assumes that unemployment benefits are set as a function of gross income 
in employment. This is so in most countries, but there are two exceptions. Germany and Austria 
                                                
28 Notice that 
  
  
 
(1- ! ) " (1 #! e ) +
1 # p
p
(1 #!u )b = ( 1# !e ) # ( 1# !u )b +
( 1# !u )b
p
= $ +
(1# !u )b
p
 
Hence, 
  
  
 
! = (1- " ) #
(1# "u )b
p
 
and 
  
  
 
!
1- "
=
(1- " ) #
(1# "u )b
p
1- "
= 1 #
(1 #"u )b
p(1- " )
$ 1# %   
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set benefits as a fixed fraction (β) of net-of-tax income in employment and exempt them from 
tax. In this case, the calculations above have to be adjusted as follows. 
First, the net income of an unemployed worker (per efficiency unit of labour) will be given by 
  (10')   
 
Fu (X) = !Fe (X)  
Hence,  
  (8')   
 
F( X) =   
 
p(S)Fe (X) + 1 ! p(S)( )Fu ( X) =  
 
pFe (X) + 1 ! p( )"Fe ( X) = p + 1! p( )"[ ]Fe ( X)  
from where 
  (17')  
 
F( Xo) =   
 
p + 1! p( )"[ ](1 !# e )e
!$X f (So )  
  (24')  
 
F' (Xo ) =    
 
p'S'(Xo ) 1 !"( )Fe (Xo ) + p + 1 ! p( )"[ ]Fe' (Xo )  
     =   
 
p'S' 1! "( )( 1! #e ) f (So )e
!$X
+ p + 1 ! p( )"[ ] 1 !T'e( )e
!$X f '(So)S' !$f (So )( ) 
If we define 
  (25')
  
 
1!T'" 1 +
1! p
p
#
$ 
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 1!T'e( )   , 
  (18') 
  
 
(1- ! ) " 1 +
1 # p
p
$
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
* ( 1# !e )     and 
  (26')   
 
! " (1# $e )( 1# %)  
we can write F and F' in the same form as in the previous section 
  (17)   
 
F( Xo) =   
 
p( 1! " ) f (So)e
!#X  
  (24)   
 
F' (Xo ) =   
 
= p'S'!e"#X f (So) + p 1 "T'( )e
"#X f ' (So )S'(Xo ) "#f (So)[ ]  
and equations (27) and (29) continue to hold as written. Notice, however, that in this case ρ is 
defined by 
  
  
 
1! " #
$
1- %
=
(1! %e )( 1! &)
1 +
1! p
p
&
' 
( 
) 
* 
+ 
, (1 !% e )
=
1! &
1 !& +
&
p
 
from where 
  (33') 
  
 
! = 1"
1" #
1" # +
#
p
=
#
p
1 "# +
#
p
=
#
p( 1" #) + #
=
#
p + ( 1" p)#
 . 
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 Decomposition of the progressivity ratio 
We can relate π to πu and πe as follows: 
  
 
1!" #
p(1 !T' )
p( 1! $ )
=
p(1 !T'e ) + (1! p)( 1!T'u )B'
p(1 !$ )
=
p( 1! $e )
( 1!T'e )
(1 !$ e )
+ (1 ! p)(1 !$u )b
(1 !T'u )B'
( 1! $u )b
p(1 !$ )
 
    
  
 
=
p( 1! "e )
p( 1! " )
( 1!#e ) +
(1 ! p)( 1 !"u )b
p(1! " )
(1 !#u )   
 
= 1! ( 1! p)"[ ](1 !#e ) + (1 ! p)"( 1!#u )  
or 
    
 
(1 !" ) = (1 !"e ) ! (1 ! p)# (1 !"e ) ! (1 !"u )[ ] = (1 !"e ) ! (1 ! p)# "u !"e( ) 
    
 
! = 1 " (1"!e ) + (1 " p)# !u "!e( ) 
    
 
! = !e + ( 1" p)# !u "!e( ) . 
Finally, notice that in the cases of Austria and Germany we will have πu = πe since net benefits 
are set as a fixed fraction of after-tax income in employment. 
 
 2. The fiscal returns to schooling 
We want to use the same procedure developed above to quantify the impact of schooling on 
government expenditures and revenues. Proceeding as above, the net present value of 
government net revenues is given by 
  (34) Vg(X) = 
  
 
Aoe
!Ho / 2 Gs(t )
0
X
" e#(R+!) tdt  + 
  
 
Ao G(X)
X
U
! e"Rt dt  -   
 
Aoe
!Ho / 2µg f (So ) e
"(R +! )t
0
X
# dt  
     +
  
 
Aoe
(g +! "# )Uq S(X)[ ]Gp (X) e
"(R+ g+! "# )t
U
Z
$ dt  
where R ≡ r -g - ν , r is the discount rate and µg the cost of education born by the government as 
a fraction of the average worker's wage.  
Differentiating Vg(), 
  
 
Vg' (X) = Aoe
!Ho / 2Gs ( X)e
"(R +! )X " Aoe
!Ho / 2µg f (So)e
"(R+! )X
             + Ao G' (X)
X
U
# e"Rt dt "G(X)e"RX
$ 
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
& 
* 
+ Aoe
(g +! "+ )U q'S'Gp X( ) + qGp' X( )[ ] e"(R+ g+! "+ )t
U
Z
# dt
$ 
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
& 
* 
 
  
 
            = Aoe
!Ho / 2Gs (X)e
"(R +! )X " Aoe
!Ho / 2µg f (So)e
"(R+!) X
             + Aoe
"RX G' (X)
1" e"RH
R
"G(X)
# 
$ 
% 
& % 
' 
( 
% 
) % 
+ Aoe
"R( X + H) q'S' Gp X( ) + qGp' X( )[ ]
1 " e
"(R +g +! "* )( Z"U )
R + g +! "*
 
and proceeding as in the previous section, it is easy to show that 
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  (35) 
  
 
R
1! e!RH
=
G' (Xo ) + " ( R) q'S' (Xo )Gp (Xo ) + qGp' (Xo )[ ]
G( Xo) !Gs (Xo )e
!#Xe#H o / 2 + µg f (So )e
!#Xe#Ho / 2
 
where 
  (36)
  
 
! ( R) =
1 " e"(R +g +# "$ )( Z"U )
e RH " 1
R
R + g +# "$
 
  
  
 
(37) Gs (X) = qs S(X)[ ]ps S( X)[ ]
                 * T ( 1!") f S(X)( )( ) + E ( 1!") f S(X)( )( ) + # cC (1 !") f S(X)( ) !T (1!" ) f S( X)( )( )[ ]{ }
        
(38) G
p
X( ) ! "P f S(X)( )e"#X( ) + T P f S(X)( )e"#X( )$% &' + ( cC P f S(X)( )e
"#X( )" T P f S(X)( )e"#X( )$% &'$% &'
 
  (39)   
 
G(X) = q S(X)[ ] p S( X)[ ]Ge (X) + 1! p S(X)[ ]( )Gu (X){ }  
with 
  (40) 
  
 
Ge (X) = T e
!"X f S(X)[ ]( ) + # cC e!"X f S(X)[ ] !T e!"X f S( X)[ ]( )$ % & 
' 
( ) + E e
!"X f S( X)[ ]( )  
 (41) 
  
 
Gu ( X) = !B e
!"X f S(X)[ ]( ) + T B e!"X f S(X)[ ]( )# $ % 
& 
' 
( + ) cC B e
!"X f S(X)[ ]( ) !T B e!"X f S(X)[ ]( )# $ % 
& 
' 
( # 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
(  
The functions q(S) and qs(S) = ηqq(S) describe the probabilities that an adult worker and a 
student respectively will be active as a function of their attainment level. Hence, G(S) denotes 
the expected net tax revenue (net of unemployment benefits) for an adult worker of attainment 
S, Gp() that generated by a pensioner, and Gs(s) by a student of attainment s --- with all three 
variables expressed in amounts per efficiency unit of labour. 
We will now calculate the different terms that appear in equation (35). To proceed, we will 
define the average and marginal propensities to consume out of after-tax income (c and C') of 
students, pensioners and adult employed and unemployed workers,  
 (42)  
  
 
cs !
C ( 1" #s )(1 "$) f (So )[ ]
(1 "# s )( 1"$ ) f (So)
     
  
 
ce !
C (1 "#e )e
"$X f (So)[ ]
( 1" #e )e
"$X f (So )
    
           
  
 
cu !
C ( 1" #u )be
"$X f (So)[ ]
(1 "#u )be
"$X f (So )
      cp !
C (1" # p )pbe
"$X
f (S
o
)%& '(
(1" # p )pbe
"$X
f (S
o
)
 
 (43)  
  
 
C'e ! C' ( 1" #e )e
"$X f (So )[ ]    
  
 
C'u ! C' (1 "#u )be
"$X f (So )[ ]    C 'p ! C ' (1" # p )pbe"$X f (So )%& '(  
and the average and marginal rates of employer's social security contributions for employed 
adult and student workers 
  (44) 
  
 
e s !
E ( 1"#) f (So )[ ]
(1 "#) f (So )
   
  
 
ee !
E e"#X f (So)[ ]
e"#X f (So)
   and  
  
 
E'e ! E' e
"#X f (So )( ) . 
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Using this notation, and the average and marginal tax rates defined in the previous section, we 
have: 
  (45) 
  
 
Gs (Xo ) = qs ps ! s + e s + !c c s (1 "! s ){ }( 1"#) f (So ) $ q%qpsTs (1 "#) f (So )    
  (46) G
p
X
o( ) = !(1! " p )(1! " ccp )pbe
!#X
f (S
o
) $ T
p
e
!#X
f (S
o
)  
  (47)   
 
Ge (Xo ) = ! e + ! c ce (1 "! e ) + ee[ ]e
"#X f (So ) $ Tee
"#X f (So )  
  (48)   
 
Gu (So) = !(1! "c cu )(1 !"u )be
!#X f (So) $ Tue
!#X f (So )  
and therefore 
  (49)   
 
G(Xo ) = q pGe (Xo ) + 1 ! p( )Gu (Xo ){ } = q pTe + 1 ! p( )Tu{ }e
!"X f (So) # qTae
!"X f (So ) . 
where we have defined the following average "total tax rates," 
   (50)   
 
Ts ! " s + es + " c c s( 1# " s )  
   T
p
! "(1" #
p
)(1" #
c
c
p
)pb  
     
 
Te ! " e + " c ce (1 #" e ) + ee  
     
 
Tu ! "(1 "# c cu )( 1" #u )b  
     
 
Ta ! pTe + 1 " p( )Tu  
Next, we calculate the derivatives of these functions with respect to X. We have: 
 (51) G
p
' X
o( ) = !(1! " cC 'p )(1! Tp ')PB 'e
!#X
f '(S
o
)S '(X
o
)!# f (S
o
)[ ] $ % 'p e
!#X
f '(S
o
)S '(X
o
)!# f (S
o
)[ ]  
(52)  
 
G'e ( Xo) = T'e +! cC'e ( 1"T'e ) + E'e[ ]e
"#X f' (So )S' (Xo ) "#f (So )[ ] $ %'e e
"#X f '(So )S'(Xo ) "#f (So )[ ] 
 (53)   
 
G'u (Xo ) = ! 1- " cC'u( ) 1!T'u( )B'e
!#X f '(So)S' (Xo ) !#f (So )[ ] $ %'u e
!#X f '(So)S' (Xo ) !#f (So )[ ] 
where we have defined 
  (54) ! '
p
" #(1# $
c
C '
p
)(1# T
p
')PB '  
  (55)   
 
!'e " T'e +#c C'e (1 $T'e ) + E'e  
  (56) 
  
 
!'u " # 1- $ cC'u( ) 1#T'u( )B'  
Finally, 
  
 
(57) G' (Xo ) = q'S' pGe (Xo ) + 1 ! p( )Gu (Xo )[ ] + q p'S' Ge (Xo ) + pG'e (Xo ) ! p'S'Gu ( Xo ) + 1! p( )G'u (Xo )[ ]
          = q'S' pTe + 1 ! p( )Tu[ ]e
-"X f(So ) + q Ge (Xo ) !Gu (Xo )[ ]p'S' +q pG'e (Xo ) + 1 ! p( )G'u (Xo )[ ]
          = q'S'Tae
-"X f(So ) + q Te !Tu( )e
-"X f(So)p'S' +q p#'e + 1 ! p( )#'u{ }e
!"X f '(So )S' (Xo ) !"f (So )[ ]
          $ q'S'Tae
-"X f(So ) + q Te !Tu( )e
-"X f(So)p'S' + q#'a e
!"X f '(So )S' (Xo ) !"f (So )[ ]       
where we have defined  
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  (58)   
 
!'a " p!'e + 1# p( )!'u         
Notice that Tp, Tu, Δ'p and Δ'u are negative. 
Substituting these expressions into the rate of return formula given in (35) and dividing 
through by qf(So)e-νX 
 
  
 
R
1! e!RH
=
G' (Xo ) + " ( R) q'S' (Xo )Gp (Xo ) + qGp' (Xo )[ ]
G( Xo) !Gs (Xo )e
!#Xe#H o / 2 + µg f (So )e
!#Xe#Ho / 2
=
q'S'Tae
-#X f(So ) + q Te !Tu( )e
-#X f(So)p'S' + q$'a e
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!#Xe#Ho / 2 + µg f (So )e
!#Xe#H o / 2
+" ( R)
q'S' (Xo )Tpe
!#X f (So ) + q$'p e
!#X f '(So)S'(Xo ) !#f (So )[ ]
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!#X f (So ) ! q%qpsTs (1 !&) f (So )e
!#Xe#H o / 2 + µg f (So )e
!#Xe#Ho / 2
 
 
  
 
=
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$H o / 2 + µge
$Ho / 2
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$H o / 2 + µge
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q
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q
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) 
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or 
    
  
 
(59) 
R
1! e!RH
=
q'
q
S' Ta + Te !Tu( )p'S' +"'a #' +$ ( R)
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q
S'(Xo )Tp + "'p #'
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.
N1 + $ (R)N 2
D
 
Alternatively, we can fix the discount rate, r, and calculate the present value of the net benefits 
of schooling. It will be convenient to discount this quantity to the period students leave school 
(at time X) and to relate it to the wage of the average worker at that time, which is given by  
    
 
Wo(X) = W(t, Xo , Ho / 2) = Aoe
gX f So( )e
!Ho / 2  
From above, we have 
 
  
 
Vg' (X) = Aoe
!Ho / 2Gs ( X)e
"(R +! )X
" Aoe
!Ho / 2µg f (So)e
"(R+! )X - Aoe
"RXG(X)
             + Aoe
"RXG' (X)
1" e"RH
R
+ Aoe
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which can be written (recall that R ≡ r -g - ν),  
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Taking each of the terms inside the bracket at a time, we have 
(61) 
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Using these expressions, we have the following expression for the marginal NPV of schooling: 
  (64) 
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 A special case  
When unemployment benefits are linked to net-of-tax income in employment and are not taxed 
the above has to be modified as follows. We have then 
  (65) 
  
 
Gu (S) = !" f (S) !T f (S)( )[ ] + #c C " f (S) !T f (S)( )( )[ ] 
with  
  
  
 
(66) Gu (So ) = !" f (So ) !T f (So)( )[ ] + #c C " f (So) !T f (So )( )( )[ ]
                   = !"(1 !# e )f (So ) + #c cu"(1 !# e )f (So) = !(1! #c cu )"(1 !# e ) f (So )
                   $ Tu f (So )
 
and 
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(67) Gu '(So ) = !" f '(So) !T' f (So)( )f '(So )[ ] + #c C'()" f ' (So ) !T' f (So )( )f '(So )[ ]
                    = !" 1!Te'( )f ' (So ) + # cCu ' " 1 !Te'( ) f' (So )
                    = ! 1 !# cCu'( )" 1 !Te'( )f '(So) $ %'u f' (So )
  
With this new definitions of Tu and Δ'u, the equation derived above for the fiscal rate of return 
continues to hold as written, and so does the net present fiscal value formula. 
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